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No serious student of the adversary system can ignore the grave
threat to the integrity of the American witness process posed by this
nation's material witness statutes. These outmoded laws,' some dating
back to the territorial period of a state's history, are not invoked in
every case, perhaps not even routinely, but when dusted off and put
into operation, these archaic statutes result in innocent citizens spend-
ing weeks--even months-in custody.2
Impossible? Not for Josephine Garitt. She spent thirty-six days in a
Washington county jail. Her "crime"? She witnessed one man's as-
sault on another Not for Titus Ward of New Orleans. He saw a
homicide in Rhode Island, dutifully reported it to the local authorities,
and in return found himself locked in a Rhode Island penitentiary for
* Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., 1956, Augustana College; J.D., 1959,
Northwestern University (Clarion De Witt Hardy Scholar); LL.M., 1961, Georgetown University
(E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow in Trial Advocacy).
** Law clerk to the Honorable John Bardgett, Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court.
B.A., 1976, University of Missouri, Columbia; J.D., 1979, Washington University.
1. See, e.g., In re Singer, 134 Cal. App. 2d 547, 285 P.2d 955 (1955) (14 days); Gebhardt v.
Buchanan, 175 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1965) (eight months); Rao v. Adams, 296 N.Y. 231, 72 N.E.2d 170
(1947) (per curiam) (92 days); Gross v. Sheriff of New York, 277 A.D. 546, 101 N.Y.S.2d 271
(1950) (77 days). See also In re Grzyeskowiak, 267 Mich. 697, 255 N.W. 359 (1934); In re
Prestigiacomo, 234 A.D. 300, 255 N.Y.S. 289 (1932); 40 NEB. L. REv. 503 (1961).
2. See Appendix B.
3. Garitt v. Sorenson, No. 2478 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 1970); see note 135 infra.
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158 days.4
A decade ago, the senior author of this article published a survey of
state material witness laws and concluded with a plea for reform.'
Shockingly, the tragedy continues today. In 1977, for example,
Timothy Wayne Thomas lost his freedom for eighty-four days in an
Oklahoma jail, where he frequently subsisted on a diet of beans. And
in 1979 Norman Cochran, after spending fifty-two days in a Nebraska
jail waiting to testify at a trial in which the defendant was ultimately
found not guilty, received absolutely no compensation or witness fees
for his period of incarceration.'
4. Quince v. State, 94 R.I. 200, 179 A.2d 485 (1962). In what has been described as one of
the worst cases of abuse under the witness statutes, two migrant farm workers, Titus Ward of New
Orleans and General Quince of Baltimore, observed a homicide in Rhode Island and were ar-
rested as material witnesses. Unable to raise bail of $5,000 each, they remained in a state peniten-
tiary among convicted felons for 158 days. Eventually, they brought their desperate situation to
light through petitions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and were released. In summarizing
the affair, the court commented: "To the innocent even a momentary deprivation of liberty is
intolerable; 158 days is an outrage. Confinement of the plaintiffs for so long a period among
criminals and forcing them to wear prison garb added the grossest insult to injury." Id at 202,
179 A.2d at 486.
Some states require that witnesses held in custody be separated from the general jail population.
See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-163 (West 1971). On occasion a confined
witness may be kept in a hotel. The need to improve the treatment of jurors and witnesses is
generally discussed in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 90-91 (1967).
5. Carlson, Jailing the Innocent: The Plight of the Material Witness, 55 IOWA L. Rev. I
(1969). See R. CARLSON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURE 83-86 (2d ed. 1978). Sporadic newspa-
per attention has been accorded the problem. See, e.g., Luna, Outrageous Laws Free Crirnina/sand
Jail Witnesses, National Enquirer, Sept. 18, 1979, at 12, col. I; Law Professor Suggests Aeform In
Material Witnesses'Detention, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1979, at 57, col. 3; Carlson, Lets Stop Jailing
Innocent Witnesses, Parade, Sept. 21, 1969, at 22, col. 4; Kimbrough, Jailing Material Witnesses,
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, June 2, 1979, § E, at 1, col. I.
6. Carter, Witness to SlayingIs Bitter Over Jailing, Tulsa World, July 3, 1977, at 1, col. 1. In
Thomas' words, "For not doing anything but cooperating with justice, I totally lost my freedom."
Id
7. Cochran v. County of Lincoln, 203 Neb. 818, 280 N.W.2d 897 (1979). The Nebraska
Supreme Court tersely rejected Cochran's claim for compensation: "While the result of this posi-
tion may work a hardship on a material witness who is unable to post bond, the solution to that
problem is for the Legislature . I..." d. at-, 280 N.W.2d at 900. Earlier, Cochran had won his
release from jail in a federal habeas corpus proceeding challenging the constitutionality of Ne-
braska's material witness statute. In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977). "Because the
entire custodial restraint of the petitioners has been at odds with the Constitution, the petitioners
should be released immediately." Id. at 1216. In releasing Cochran, the federal judge warned
that there was no constitutional right to compensation, a clairvoyant statement in view of the




These laws, in short, stand ready to ensnare the innocent observer of
a crime in at least forty-five states.' Many remain in their early, anach-
ronistic form-virtually unchanged since their original passage in the
1880's. Moreover, despite recently enacted revisions in federal material
witness procedures,9 significant questions persist on the number of wit-
nesses imprisoned in federal jails today. Statistics collected, published,
and analyzed here for the first time suggest that the United States Gov-
ernment may be operating a witness detention program of substantial
dimensions-a program resulting in the incarceration of hundreds
upon hundreds of witnesses each year!
How do these laws work? Suppose that Mr. Smith, a New Yorker, is
visiting Chicago. While windowshopping at a jewelry store, a robber
suddenly runs from the store, firing a revolver, and escapes. Smith de-
scribes the culprit to the police, who then ask him to view several men
in a lineup. He picks out the guilty man, who is charged with armed
robbery. Smith now becomes a candidate for treatment under the ma-
terial witness laws. He may be released; on the other hand, he may be
required to post a sizable bond guaranteeing his return to testify at
trial. If he cannot scrape up the necessary cash, he can be held until
trial. Thus ironically, while the person who committed the crime may
be out on bail, Mr. Smith-an innocent witness to that crime-may be
confined for a substantial period before the case comes to trial.
Adding to the irony is the frequent denial of certain rudiments of fair
process to witnesses jailed because of their inability to make bail, in-
cluding compensation for days spent in jail waiting to testify, 10 ap-
pointment of counsel," and special provision for early release.' 2 The
8. A survey of applicable statutes from each state is located in Appendix B.
9. Federal law, by and large, is more modem than the numerous state statutes. As recently
as 1978, Congress amended federal law by raising detained witness fees to thirty dollars per day.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1821(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 1979). See note 216 infra and accompanying text. Despite a
number of commendable provisions, however, federal law still contains gaps in coverage. See
note 208 infra.
10. See Cochran v. County of Lincoln, 203 Neb. 818, 280 N.W.2d 897 (1979) (citing Barber
v. Moss, 3 Utah 2d 268, 282 P.2d 838 (1955)); notes 87-94 infra. See also 5 UTAH L. REv. 119
(1956); 21 YALE LJ. 327 (1912). Of historical significance is Markwell v. Warren County, 53 Iowa
422, 5 N.W. 570 (1880), which denied recovery to a witness confined for 95 days. Statutory correc-
tion of the problem came with the 1978 revisions of the Iowa Criminal Code. See IOWA CODE
ANN. § 815.6 (West 1978).
I1. See Carlson, supra note 5, at 2 n.2, 13-15. In Inre Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb.
1977), the court noted: "[A] material witness should be afforded an unqualified right to counsel."
Id. at 1214. The opinion concluded that due process required counsel for the witness and, if
necessary, that counsel be appointed at state expense. The court also held that the witness should
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opportunity for prompt appeal of confinement orders also would seem
appropriate for witnesses not charged with a public offense."
For the most part, these jailings are not for the protection of wit-
nesses, but for the convenience of litigants-typically, to assure prose-
cutors that witnesses will be present to testify at trial.14  Unlike
protected witnesses who perhaps want the security of confinement, the
witnesses discussed in this article are largely unwilling admittees to the
nation's jails. In an era when Americans are urged to "get involved"
and assist the administration of justice by volunteering information to
clear up crimes, harsh material witness statutes operate to discourage
citizen participation in the criminal justice system. Under several state
laws, an out-of-state witness who advances important information may
be locked up for an extended period if he lacks the money to post bond.
Cases on record reveal that witnesses have been told to either put up as
much as $50,000 in bail or go to jail until the accused is tried. 15
To remedy such injustices the authors, after examining cases de-
cided 6 and legislation adopted 7 during the last ten years, will propose
a model material witness law'8 that would ameliorate the harshness of
many statutes now on the books and strike a balance between the need
for courtroom testimony and the individual liberty of citizens.' 9
be afforded other procedural protections such as an opportunity to be heard in person and to
confront adverse witnesses. Id
12. Hearings on . 1357 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary
Con=m, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 305 (1965); 40 NEB. L. REv. 503, 508 (1961). Petition for writ of
habeas corpus is one of the most frequently employed procedural vehicles for attacking imprison-
ment of witnesses. See Richards v. Warden, 277 A.D. 87, 98 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1950).
13. See Appendix B (model provision for expedited appeal).
14. For cases in which witnesses are held for the defense, see notes 101-16 infra.
15. Bail for witnesses is treated in depth in notes 43-52 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 20-135 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 136-205 infra and accompanying text. Some states have made important and
progressive strides. See notes 178-92 infra and accompanying text. Other states have retained
their outmoded laws. See notes 193-205 infra and accompanying text. Appendix A briefly sum-
marizes the law in each state.
18. See Appendix B.
19. This model statute includes opportunity for preservation of evidence, deposition and re-
lease of witnesses, counsel for witnesses proceeded against, and provisions for separate confine-




II. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. Historical Antecedents
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that every witness has a
duty "to appear when commanded to testify to aid the courts in the
administration of justice." 20 The strength of this principle, however,
has not prevented courts from analyzing the validity of schemes, statu-
tory and otherwise, for the detention of material witnesses. Cases de-
cided since 1969 reflect much of society's new attitude toward human
rights. Surprisingly, many of the recent decisions advocating a progres-
sive, humane approach to witness imprisonment follow judicial pro-
nouncements dating as far back as the early 1800's. Thus, the current
liberal approach to selected aspects of the witness incarceration process
reflects the adoption of a more equitable position, but it is a position
long advocated by certain judges.
The origins of the power to confine material witnesses has been a
subject of debate among the authorities. Several jurists have contended
that the power originated in the common law,21 but some courts have
traced modem material witness detention laws to an English statute
passed in the mid-1500's under the monarchy of Phillip and Mary. 2
Whether by common law or statute, however, numerous jurisdictions
limited the power to incarcerate witnesses to justices of the peace and
coroners in cases in which the accused had been committed on a pre-
liminary examination and held to await action by the grand jury. 3
Many modem authorities still follow this approach, but further limit
exercise of the power to committing magistrates alone.2 4 By statute de-
tention of witnesses is available only in criminal proceedings actually
pending, not mere investigations.25
Under the early cases, imprisonment of witnesses was authorized
only "in the event of refusal of the witnesses to appear or to furnish
recognizances as ordered."'  As bail became a recognized requirement
to insure the attendance of witnesses, imprisonment also was author-
ized in the event of a refusal to post bail. Courts have deemed an in-
20. Di Palma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 297-98, 303 A.2d 709, 711 (1972).
21. See e.g., In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 450 (1911).
22. Id.; Linsky v. County of Luzerne, 101 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 44 (1931).
23. In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 450-51 (1911).
24. Carlson, supra note 5, at 6-7 nn. 19 & 20.
25. La Tempa v. Hughes, 182 Misc. 1078, 50 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
26. In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 451 (1911).
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ability to pay as synonymous with a refusal.
B. Federal Cases
Over the years the power to bind witnesses by recognizance to testify
before grand juries and at trials became a well-accepted principle, "es-
sential to the due administration of justice."2 8  United States v.
Durling2 9 was one of the earliest cases to confirm the power of the fed-
eral government to bind witnesses; Bacon v. United States3 ° and United
States v. Feingold3' are among the more recent.
Bacon and Feingold hold that the federal government's power to ar-
rest and detain material witnesses may be inferred from section 3149 of
the Bail Reform Act of 196632 and rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 33 Neither provision, however, contains any direct
authority for the material witness warrants issued in those cases. The
Bacon court reasoned that rule 46(b)'s bail provisions would make lit-
tle sense if they empowered courts to impose bail but denied "the
power to issue a warrant for the purpose of bringing the witness before
the court in the first instance. '34 The Feingold case, moreover, alluded
to judicial authority to review preliminarily the validity of a proposed
arrest. Because the power to issue material witness warrants is based
27. Howard & Cook v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398, 402 (1872); Carlson, supra note 5, at 6 n.15.
28. In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 453 (1911).
29. 25 F. Cas. 944 (N.D. 111. 1869) (No. 15,010).
30. 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971). See In re September 1971 Grand Jury, 454 F.2d 580, 584
n.4 (7th Cir. 1971), rep'd on other grounds sub. nonm United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
31. 416 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
32. If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any criminal
proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure his presence
by subpoena, a judicial officer shall impose conditions of release pursuant to section
3146. No material witness shall be detained because of inability to comply with any
condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by depo-
sition, and further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure ofjustice. Release may
be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be
taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1976).
33. If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any criminal
proceeding and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure his presence by
subpoena, the court or commissioner may require him to give bail for his appearance as
a witness, in an amount fixed by the court or commissioner. If the person fails to give
bail the court or commissioner may commit him to the custody of the marshall pending
final disposition of the proceeding in which the testimony is needed, may order his re-
lease if he has been detained for an unreasonable length of time and may modify at any
time the requirement as to bail.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b).
34. 449 F.2d at 937.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss1/5
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on an inferred power, "restraint of that power by suitable judicial ac-
tion in appropriate circumstances may also be inferred."35 The court
thus affirmed its jurisdiction over an application to quash a material
witness warrant prior to its service.
The reasoning applied in Bacon and Feingold is indicative of the
considerable discretion exercised by judges in material witness matters.
In 1928 Cunningham v. Barry36 held that the choice of process to secure
the attendance of a witness "is a matter resting in the sound discretion
of the court issuing the writ. 37 Since that time, courts have greatly
expanded and detailed those factors which should guide judicial discre-
tion in determining whether to take a witness into custody. These fac-
tors include the materiality and necessity of the witness' testimony,38
the degree of diligence that would be required of the prosecutor to pro-
duce the witness if not confined,39 and the likelihood of flight by the
prospective witness.40
Discretion in applying these criteria is vested in the courts because of
the nature of the material witness detention process itself. A court
should not act on the representations of the prosecutor alone, but
should exercise its independent judgment. In exercising its discretion,
the nature of the prosecution's request dictates caution. As stated re-
cently in State v. Reid,4 the "[c]onfinement of a witness, even for a few
days, not charged with a crime, is a harsh and oppressive measure
which we believe is justified only in the most extreme circumstances."
The court in Little v. Territory42 also considered the power to bind wit-
nesses to be an extraordinary one--one that should be exercised only in
urgent situations-and suggested the need to adopt specific statutory
guidelines and safeguards for use of the power to bind witnesses.
35. 416 F. Supp. at 628.
36. 25 F.2d 733 (E.D. Pa.), rev'don other grounds, 29 F.2d 817 (3rd Cir. 1928), rev'd on other
grounds, 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
37. Id. at 735.
38. Beaver v. Carey, 426 F. Supp. 301, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
39. People v. Baldwin, 74 Mich. App. 700, 702-04, 254 N.W.2d 619, 621 (1977), rer'don other
grounds, 405 Mich. 550, 275 N.W.2d 253 (1979); People v. Harringer, 65 Mich. App. 649, 650, 237
N.W.2d 598, 599 (1975).
40. Expare Sheppard, 43 Tex. Crim. 372, 374, 66 S.W. 304, 306 (1902).
41. 114 Ariz. 16, 25, 559 P.2d 136, 145 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 921 (1977).
42. 28 Okla. 467, 469, 114 P. 699, 699-700 (1911). See also People v. Louis D., 82 Misc. 2d
68, 368 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Fam. Ct. 1975).
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C. Bail Procedures
Lawyers seeking to challenge confinement of a witness must first de-
termine whether valid bail-recognizance procedures were followed.
Unfortunately, no decisions handed down after 1969 appear to deal
specifically with this important aspect of witness procedures. In light of
the paucity of current litigation, several older precedents apparently
govern this nuts-and-bolts feature of the detention problem. Bickley .
Commonwealth43 drew a distinction between requiring a witness to
enter his recognizance for appearance at trial and the more burden-
some requirement that a witness put up bail. The latter requirement, in
the court's view, could be authorized only by statute. Absent a specific
authorizing statute, a judge could only order the witness to enter into
personal recognizance. 44 No inherent judicial power to require security
could be implied, according to the court, because at stake is the "liberty
of a law-abiding citizen, who, through no fault of his own, has become
a material witness [in] a criminal prosecution. 45
In most cases in which special security is required, the court extracts
bail from a witness because the district attorney believes that the wit-
ness is material and intends to move out of the country,46 not because
the witness has made any demonstrable attempt to evade the process of
the court.47 For this reason, a serious crime must be involved to de-
prive a witness of his liberty. As a general rule, a witness cannot be
held to bail in a misdemeanor case.48
Judicial discretion is a critical factor in setting the amount of bail.
The judge must balance the necessity of a witness' presence at trial and
his "constitutional right to freedom from unnecessary restraint. '49 Bail
for a witness can be made so excessive that it becomes "tantamount to
43. 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Marsh.) 573 (1829).
44. Id. at 574. See Ljubsich v. Brown, 276 Il. 186, 114 N.E. 583 (1916); Andrew Latshaw's
Case, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 96 (Ct. Common Pleas 1842).
45. Troy v. Pettit, 19 Misc. 280, -, 44 N.Y.S. 256, 257 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
46. Howard & Cook v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398, 402 (1872).
47. Exparte Sheppard, 43 Tex. Crim. 372, 66 S.W. 304 (1902).
Now, it would operate a great hardship if, under such circumstances, a witness is to be
imprisoned indefinitely, when other witnesses who may have actually evaded process or
have been in default as witnesses are brought before the court, and they are permitted to
be enlarged on their personal security.
Id. at 374, 66 S.W. at 306.
48. Exparte Riddle, 25 Okla. Crim. 25, 218 P. 894 (1923).




keeping him in jail at the will of the District Attorney."5 In determin-
ing whether a witness' bail is reasonable or excessive, courts have con-
sidered the location of his residence and his family roots, the source of
his income and property status, and the condition of his health."
Sometimes, courts affrming high bail amounts have emphasized that
circumstances indicating that the witness is not completely innocent or
uninvolved (such as shielding the accused or making false statements)
will justify a heavier levy of bail.52
D. Witness Detention as a Subter/'uge
The material witness detention process has not always been used for
its intended purpose-to secure live testimony for trial. Over the years
prosecutors and police have sometimes invoked the power to confine
criminal suspects as witnesses while gathering evidence against the wit-
ness-defendant.
Wilson v. State53 provides a modem example. Police apprehended
defendant as a murder suspect. After two days of questioning, the state
obtained an order to hold him as a material witness. Six more days of
confinement and questioning resulted in his confessing to a homicide.
Only then did the state obtain a warrant charging him with murder.
Although ruling improper the initial forty-eight hour detention, the
Georgia Supreme Court held that defendant's confession was voluntary
and admissible at trial.5 4
The action of the Georgia court was not without precedent. Twenty-
two years before in People v. Perez,55 the New York Court of Appeals
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Lloyd, 26 F. Cas. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 15,614); O'Connel v.
McElhiney, 138 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Goodrich v. Warden, 137 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
52. See, eg., Exparte Rankin, 330 Mich. 91,47 N.W.2d 28 (1951). Courts affirming the trial
court's bail judgment often state that the amount must be "necessary and reasonable.' People v.
Doe, 283 A.D. 988, 989, 131 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (1954). Bail should be fixed sufficiently high to protect
"the rights of the people ... in their efforts to punish and eliminate crime[s]." Weiner v. Collins,
22 N.Y.S.2d 774,775 (Sup. Ct.), aJ'd, 260 A.D. 806, 22 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1940). A witness' undertak-
ing also should "be large enough so that the sureties on his undertaking would see that the witness
would appear" at the trial proceedings. Exparte Prall, 89 Okla. Crim. 413,415,208 P.2d 960, 960
(1949). A witness' opportunity to give his testimony immediately could validate the size of the
bail. State v. McGouldrick, 169 La. 187, 124 So. 823 (1929).
53. 229 Ga. 395, 191 S.E.2d 783 (1972).
54. Id at 398, 191 S.E.2d at 784.
55. 300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E.2d 40 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950).
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affirmed a robbery-murder conviction involving facts similar to Wilson.
Thirteen detectives questioned defendant during a four-day period be-
tween his arrest and his commitment as a material witness. After being
questioned for thirty-two hours of a thirty-six hour period, defendant
confessed. The court found that because defendant at the time of his
arrest had possession of a coat belonging to the murder victim, he had
sufficient knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the murder to
justify his commitment as a material witness.56 The police could prop-
erly use this procedure because at the time of his commitment they
"did not have sufficient information to arraign him upon a murder
charge. 5 7
Similar circumstances again arose in New York when a murder sus-
pect was initially held as a material witness in a 1962 case. 8 On his
arraignment as a material witness, a federal judge cautioned petitioner
that if he was a witness he should cooperate, but if he was a suspect he
should not talk to anyone. 59 After sixty-two days of confinement and
questioning, petitioner was discharged as a material witness, booked
for homicide, and later convicted. The court found that he had been
lawfully committed as a material witness, that as a witness he had not
been denied his constitutional rights when questioned during his com-
mitment in the absence of his attorney, and that his detention was not
merely a "ruse to extract a confession from him."60 On review, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit conceded that
the material witness process opens up "extensive possibilities for abuse
of personal liberty,"'I but affirmed the conviction.62
The Second Circuit continued to uphold detention of New York sus-
pects as witnesses when it affirmed the material witness detention and
subsequent murder conviction of Edward Allen.63 Although the court
56. Id. at 219, 90 N.E.2d at 46.
57. Id.
58. Glinton v. Denno, 200 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 309 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1962), cer.
denied, 372 U.S. 938 (1963).
59. Id. at 644.
60. Id. at 646.
61. 309 F.2d at 544.
62. Id. at 545. Defendant tried once more to obtain habeas corpus relief, but was rebuffed
when the appellate court held that defendant's continued detention after the discharge of the
grand jury did not violate the fourth amendment. Glinton v. Denno, 339 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965). According to the court, a mere technicality like the discharging
of the grand jury cannot invalidate an otherwise proper witness commitment. .d. at 876.




of appeals observed that expansion of fourth and fifth amendment
rights, together with stricter scrutiny of New York's material witness
law, "may indicate that Perez would be decided differently today,"64 it
ruled that New York's procedure should not be held retroactively un-
constitutional.6
Police and prosecutors have not always been successful in upholding
convictions based on evidence acquired through the use (and occa-
sional abuse) of material witness procedures. Numerous decisions il-
lustrate the reluctance of courts to certify detention of an accused
person under the guise of a material witness statute. In State v. Price66
police picked up defendant, interrogated him, and charged him as a
material witness in a murder case. Unable to make $10,000 bail, the
police held defendant in the county jail until he was taken to his apart-
ment in the company of police officers. There, the police conducted a
warrantless search and seized certain items, which incriminated de-
fendant. A New Jersey appellate court granted defendant's motion to
suppress the seized evidence, noting that the true motive of the authori-
ties was to hold defendant "to inquire into his possible criminality
rather than as a material witness against another."'67 New Jersey's ma-
terial witness law does not "extend to the detention of potential defend-
ants under investigation" or to "possible suspects on the mere suspicion
that they know something."68 If no offender exists, no material witness
can be held.
Oregon has been the locus of two important decisions invalidating
witness "holds." In State v. Lloyd 69 an extremely intoxicated defend-
ant attempted to enter a burning building. Police restrained him from
entering the blaze and held him in jail as a "friendly drunk," a non-
criminal offense. After questioning, defendant admitted his involve-
ment in the burning. Discovery of deaths in the fire brought Miranda
warnings, more questioning, and the changing of defendant's status
from "detox" to "material witness." Additional questioning followed
until police arrested and charged defendant after four days of confine-
ment. In overturning his conviction, the appellate court found that de-
64. Id. at 244. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
65. 411 F.2d at 244.
66. 108 N.J. Super. 272, 260 A.2d 877 (1970).
67. Id. at 28 1, 260 A.2d at 882.
68. Id. at 280-81, 260 A.2d at 882.
69. 22 Or. App. 254, 538 P.2d 1278 (1975).
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fendant's detention as a material witness failed to comply strictly with
statutory procedure. No one had been charged with a crime when de-
fendant was first confined as a witness; nor had the commitment order
originated with a magistrate or judge as required. Absent compliance
with these statutory guidelines, "the state lack[ed] the power to infringe
upon the rights of an individual by 'detaining' him as a material wit-
ness."
70
In 1978 State v. McKendall7" followed the Lloyd decision closely.
Again, police failed to comply with certain provisions in Oregon's ma-
terial witness law. The court placed the burden on the state to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the taint from the illegal detention
had dissipated by the time the incriminating statement was given.72
E. Constitutional Attacks
Periodic attacks upon the constitutionality of material witness stat-
utes have mounted over the years, some of them dating to 1872. The
scope of the attacks vary, some aiming at a particular aspect of the
witness statute, others broadly claiming the statute's unconstitutional-
ity. An 1872 Minnesota case upheld the validity of witness incarcera-
tion, but only if certain vital principles were respected:
[The witness may be required to recognize in the discretion of the court,
the discretion (or judgment) here spoken of must, as in all other like cases,
be intended to be a sound legal discretion. The judgment of the court
cannot be capriciously exercised. It cannot legally abuse its discretion,
nor, indeed, is it to be presumed that it will. If, for instance, it would be
unjust or oppressive, and against common law and common right, as it
certainly would be ... to commit such material witness in default of bail,
70. Id. at 276, 538 P.2d at 1289.
71. 36 Or. App. 187, 584 P.2d 316 (1978).
72. Id. at 192, 584 P.2d at 320. The court held that the state's giving of Miranda rights did
not discharge its responsibility.
Other types of abuses have been alleged in other cases, but without uniform success in overturn-
ig convictions. In two cases defendants have argued that the court influenced the testimony of
witnesses when it invoked its power to confine witnesses. That the court issued bench warrants for
witnesses was not sufficient to void a defendant's conviction in People v. Rogers, 27 111. App. 3d
123, 327 N.E.2d 163 (1975). Nor did the appellate court in Feutralle v. United States, 209 F.2d
159 (5th Cir. 1954), find that the witness had been intimidated by the court's temporary custody
order. The witness abandoned his hostile and evasive testimonial attitude and became extremely
cooperative and helpful to the government after the court's order. In another case the court de-
nied defendant's application to take the deposition of a confined material witness after the prose-
cution moved the witness from the county jail to a hotel. State v. Anthoulis, 62 Ohio App. 113, 23




without any proof that he had any intention of not appearing and testify-
ing when duly subpoened, but who is too poor to render his recognizance
of any value, or too fundless to be able to give bail, in what sense legal
discretion, the court would be warranted in so doing; or what interest of
the state requires the incarceration of such a person? Certainly none.73
Substantive due process is a major focus in many decisions.74 One rul-
ing applied a balancing test including such factors as the "interests of
society," "enforcement of the criminal laws," and the witness' own wel-
fare." Other courts have applied a procedural due process analysis to
require that "exact legal procedure" be followed before committing a
material witness to prison,7 6 especially a hearing and an opportunity to
be heard before confinement 77 by the committing magistrate.78 Al-
though some states do so by legislation, one court by judicial fiat estab-
lished a detained material witness' right to representation. 79 The court
ruled that legal representation is a fundamental right of every citizen,
even a witness, and impediments to the free exercise of this right are
"intolerable."80
More recent cases continue to reflect many of the judicial attitudes
contained in earlier opinions-witness detention statutes are constitu-
tional, but procedural correctness must be observed. Yambo v. Jen-
nings' found no constitutional infirmity in jailing a witness who had
been afforded a prior hearing to contest the district attorney's right to
detain him." United States v. Anfield s3 eliminated a number of fifth
amendment impediments to confinement and interrogation by ruling
that the custody of a material witness "was not of the type requiring
Miranda warnings." 4
73. Howard & Cook v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398, 403-04 (1872). The court further observed that
Minnesota's material witness law was valid under the fourteenth amendment and the state's con-
stitution.
74. See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973); notes 85, 106 infra.
75. Bolt v. Society, 48 Misc. 175, -, 95 N.Y.S. 250, 251 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
76. Commonwealth v. Moxitch, 18 Northampton 151, 152, 2 Pa. D. & C. 31, 33 (1921).
77. In re Lewellen, 104 Mich. 318, 320, 62 N.W. 554, 554 (1895).
78. Exparte Shaw, 61 Cal. 58, 59 (1882).
79. In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447 (1911). On the federal approach to counsel in witness pro-
ceedings, see notes 204-05 infra. For a model statute containing a guarantee of counsel for wit-
nesses, see Appendix B.
80. 20 Hawaii at 454.
81. 220 Pa. Super. 186, 286 A.2d 909 (1971).
82. id. at 188, 286 A.2d at 910-11.
83. 539 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 677.
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Just as lack of representation by counsel has been attacked as uncon-
stitutional, so has the paucity of fees for detained witnesses. The
United States Supreme Court in Hurtado v. United States8" held that
the pay provisions of the federal material witness laws, which limited
detained witnesses to one dollar per day in fees while in confinement
awaiting trial, was not a taking of property without just compensation
under the fifth amendment.8 6 Nor was the payment so low that it con-
stituted involuntary servitude under the thirteenth amendment.8 7
Neither was the statute's classification scheme, which paid twenty dol-
lars per day to any witness attending trial but only one dollar to de-
tained witnesses, a violation of the due process clause. The court
refused to "pass upon the wisdom or ultimate fairness of the compensa-
tion" or decide "that a more just and humane system could not be de-
vised."8
Not all material witness laws, however, have been approved as con-
stitutionally sound vehicles for detaining witnesses. The Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in Allen v. La Vallee 9 mentioned in dictum that the
expansion of fourth and fifth amendment rights left little room for up-
holding New York's previous material witness statute. 90 In In re
Cochran9 a federal district court recently ruled that Nebraska's mate-
rial witness statute violated the federal equal protection and due proc-
ess clauses.92 State authorities failed to comply with procedural due
process in two respects: (1) no written notice of the allegations upon
which the state relied had been provided to petitioners; and (2) no writ-
ten statement of the evidence and reasons for the adverse decision had
ever been supplied to them.93 Failure to provide due notice forced pe-
titioners to rely upon speculation and experiment to discover the appli-
85. 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
86. Id. at 589.
87. Id. at 589-90 n.11.
88. Id. at 591 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). For Congress' revisions
of the federal pay provisions after Huriado, see note 216 infra.
89. 411 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 971 (1969).
90. Id. at 244. The New York legislature later revised this law. See note 182 infra.
In Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth Circuit avoided the constitu-
tional issue, citing inadequate "briefing and argument" of the point. Id. at 941.
91. 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977). Two brothers, James and Norman Cochran, had been
placed in custody by virtue of Nebraska's material witness statute. The federal court ordered their
release from jail after a substantial stay "[b]ecause the entire custodial restraint of the petitioners
has been at odds with the Constitution." Id. at 1216. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
92. 434 F. Supp. at 1212, 1216.




cable procedures and standards in the state's material proceedings---"a
situation yielding the most basic unfairness. 94
F. The Fee Controversy
Inequities in the material witness detention process do not necessa-
rily end when the witness is finally released after testifying. In some
instances the witness receives little or no compensation for loss of time.
In one case a witness jailed for 297 days for failure to give a recogni-
zance was denied all recovery, because the "cause in which she had
been required to recognize was never brought to trial."' 95 Because she
never testified in the circuit court, she never was in the attendance of
the court as required for compensation under the witness fee statute.96
One of the more extreme instances in this century occurred in the
Lindbergh kidnapping case. Although the state lodged him in a hotel
rather than in civil prison, one witness had nothing to show for 892
days of lost time except the state's gratitude.97
The material witness problems of the Cochran brothers in Nebraska
were noted earlier.98 A federal district court judge ordered their release
from confinement, but warned them that there was no "constitutional
right to monetary compensation for time spent in confinement as a ma-
terial witness."99 Still, the brothers sued for witness fees. In Cochran v.
County of Lincoln, decided in 1979, the Nebraska Supreme Court
turned down their entire request for fees:
One who is retained in custody as a material witness pursuant to Ne-
women and minors by placing a $100 ceiling on the amount of any recognizance that a married
woman or minor could personally provide. Id. at 1212.
94. Id. at 1216.
95. Sawyer v. Greene, 91 Wis. 500, 501, 65 N.W. 181, 181 (1895).
96. Id. at 502-03, 65 N.W. at 181. See generally 21 YALE L.J. 327 (1912). Even innocent
witnesses committed to jail by means of an invalid process have been denied all fees. One court
placed the burden for challenging the validity of the witness' illegal 88-day detention completely
on the witness. Commonwealth v. Moxitch, 18 Northampton 151,2 Pa. D. & C. 31 (1921). But V.c
Kramfert v. Dauphin County, 25 Pa. D. 153, 154 (1916) ("Whether the right of a witness to re-
cover in a case of this kind depends on the regularity or validity of the process to which he is
subjected is open to grave doubt."). Certain decisions have established that prison inmates are not
entitled to witness fees regardless of the circumstances under which they must testify. See, e.g.,
Meadows v. United States Marshal, 434 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1970); Marchese v. United States, 453
F.2d 1268 (Ct. Cl. 1972); In re Napoli, 85 Misc. 2d 752, 381 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
97. In re Wendel, 173 Misc. 819, 18 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
98. See notes 7, 93 supra and accompanying text.
99. In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1215 (D. Neb. 1977).
100. 280 N.W.2d 897 (Neb. 1979).
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braska's material witness law is not actually employed in attendance on
the court during all the time that the individual is in custody. . . . [A]
material witness held in custody is only actually employed in attendance
on the court during that period of time in which trial of the matter for
which the individual is being incarcerated is conducted.' 0
Despite its holding, the court admitted that "there is probably no pay-
ment adequate to compensate a material witness who must remain in
custody solely due to his financial inability to post bond and secure his
release."102
Material witness fee statutes have not always been interpreted so
narrowly. Some jurisdictions view the granting of fees to detained wit-
nesses as a method to speed trials. One case noted that fee legislation
should be liberally construed to encourage prosecutors "to shorten the
detention by trying the case as soon as possible."'' 0 "The inability to
give bail and consequent detention [are] the misfortune, rather than the
fault, of the witness."'' "4 Another enlightened court declared that wit-
ness fee laws were intended to place a confined witness "as nearly as
may be on the same footing as the ordinary witness, who is entitled to
use for his own advantage such portion of his time as is not required for
the service of the public."'10 5
As applied to pretrial detention, the federal witness fee statute was
narrowly construed in Hurado v. United States.10 6 Although petition-
ers sought twenty dollars per day during their entire period of incarcer-
ation, the United States Supreme Court limited their recovery to one
dollar per day for the weeks spent in jail before the trial began and
twenty dollars per day while the trial was in progress.' 0 7 According to
the Court, a detained witness "is in the same position as a nonincarcer-
ated witness who is summoned to appear on the first day of trial, but on
arrival is told by the prosecutor that he is to hold himself ready to tes-
tify on a later day in the trial."'' 0 8
101. Id. at 900.
102. Id.
103. Linsky v. County of Luzerne, 101 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 46 (1931).
104. Robinson v. Chambers, 94 Mich. 471, 472-73, 54 N.W. 176, 176 (1893) (per curiam); see
Higginson's Case, 12 F. Cas. 132, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1802) (No. 6,471).
105. Kirke v. Stafford County, 76 N.H. 181, 183, 80 A. 1046, 1047 (1911). The awarding of
fees to a detained witness does not deprive a criminal defendant of a fair trial, regardless of when
they are paid. People v. Hill, 32 Mich. App. 404, 410, 188 N.W.2d 896, 899 (1971).
106. 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
107. Id. at 586.
108. Id. at 590. Since Hurado, the federal statute has been revised. See note 216 infra. For
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G. The Alien Detention Problem
When the witness detention statutes originated in the 1800's, their
use in illegal alien cases was largely unforeseen. In some cases, for
example, the government now holds Mexican aliens as witnesses
against the person who arranged their illegal entry into the United
States. 109
In cases in which alien witnesses might give testimony exonerating
the alleged smuggler, a different question arises: can the government
promptly deport smuggled aliens to their homelands before the defend-
ant-smuggler's attorney has an opportunity to interview them?"' A
key case in this area is United States v. Mendez-Rodriquez,' in which
additional cases and analysis on the witness fee problem, see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1439 (1956).
Statutes relating to witness fees are detailed in the next section of this article. See notes 162-70
hifra and accompanying text.
109. A federal court's power to detain smuggled aliens pending trial of their smugglers has
long been recognized. See, e.g., In re Aliens, 231 F. 335 (N.D.N.Y. 1916); Comment, The Wetback
as Material Witness.: Pretrial Detention or Deposition, 7. CAL. W.L. REv. 175 (1970).
110. Deprivation of the right to confront detained witnesses is not a problem unique to the
1970's. It has long been recognized "that witnesses do not belong to the state any more than they
belong to the defense." Atkins v. State, 115 Ohio St. 542, 550, 155 N.E. 189, 191, cert. denied, 274
U.S. 720 (1927). For this reason, defense counsel should not be refused the right to interview a
detained witness in private.
Generally speaking, a person under detention as a witness for the state should not in any
sense be sequestered. His detention is merely for the purpose of insuring his presence at
the trial. He is not charged with crime. He is an unfortunate victim of the necessity
under which the state rests for securing the preservation of its evidence. Under ordinary
circumstances, such persons should be subjected to no further disabilities or inconve-
nience than the exigencies of the occasion absolutely require. Neither should persons
who desire to talk to him be subjected to limitations or embarrassment.
The witness should be placed as nearly as possible in the same condition as he would
be if unrestrained. A witness who is not placed under bond, or who is so placed and
given bail, is free to talk to any one he wishes. It is hard to see why the fact that the
witness fails, or is unable, to give bond, should subject either the witness or any one else
to unusual conditions in discussing facts concerning the trial in which it is understood
that the person detained will be a witness for the prosecution. Certainly, if a witness who
is laboring under no mental disability, and who is not peculiarly under the mental con-
trol or domination of the party who seeks the interview, can be sequestered by being put
under a large bond, and can only be interviewed in the presence of the prosecuting attor-
ney, the door is open to grave abuses which, in our opinion, are not contemplated by the
necessary law which provides that persons deemed by the state to be material witnesses
on its behalf may be detained unless reasonable security for their presence at the trial is
provided.
State v. Susan, 152 Wash. 365, 372, 278 P. 149, 152 (1929). But see Schweinberger v. Casey, 171
Misc. 601, 11 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Atkins v. State, 115 Ohio St. 542, 155 N.E. 189, cert.
denied, 274 U.S. 720 (1927). For additional cases and analysis, see Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 652
(1967).
111. 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that such
action by the government deprives defendants of their fifth and sixth
amendment rights." 2 As a direct result, many illegal aliens are being
confined as material witnesses." 3
Several inroads have been made on the Mendez-Rodriquez rule. The
Ninth Circuit has conceded that "there may be some circumstances in
which Mendez-Rodriquez will not apply."" 4 Further, a defendant who
does not make an affirmative effort while preparing for trial to obtain
the identity of alien witnesses, or to request that they be detained, can-
not successfully claim denial of his constitutional rights when these
aliens are deported before he interviews them." 5 In addition, several
courts, relying on the Mendez court's disinclination "to indulge in any
speculation that the alien interviews would, or would not, have been
fruitful to the defense,""I6 have rejected attacks on convictions by argu-
ing the improbability that the alien witness' testimony would have fa-
vored the defendant." 7
There also has been a movement in the direction of allowing the trial
court to exercise judicial discretion in determining whether all or some
aliens should be detained.l"I One court observed that such discretion is
essential to bring human value considerations into play." 9 As with
112. Id. at 5.
113. The Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1979, § A, at 7, col. 1.
114. United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1974); see United States v. Marti-
nez-Frausto, 463 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1972).
115. Uribe v. United States, 529 F.2d 742, 743 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Francisco-
Romandia, 503 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975);
United States v. Lomeli-Garnica, 495 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Romero, 469
F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); State v. Islas, 119 Ariz. 559, 560, 582 P.2d 649, 650-51
(1978).
116. 450 F.2d at 5.
117. See United States v. Orozco-Rico, 589 F.2d 433,435 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 440 U.S.
967 (1979); United States v. Ballesteros-Acuna, 527 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Castellanos-Machorro, 512 F.2d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mosca, 355 F. Supp.
267, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But see People v. Mejia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 574, 581, 129 Cal. Rptr. 192,
196 (1976). Cases denying relief to defendants include United States v. McQuillan, 507 F.2d 30
(9th Cir. 1974) (alien not a witness to crime for which defendant was charged); United States v.
Moreno-Flores, 461 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (defendant cannot claim he thought
all rather than just some aliens would be called as prosecution witnesses); In re Jesus B., 75 Cal.
App. 3d 444, 142 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1977) (prosecution not required to invoke material witness stat-
ute in state proceeding).
118. See United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977);
United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1974).
119. United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1974).
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material witnesses generally, the illegal alien is treated in these cases
"like a person accused of a noncapital crime."' 120  Simple equity re-
quires that a balancing test be applied in each case. Neither the gov-
ernment nor the defense should be allowed to impose "a substantial
hardship for only a remote possibility of benefit to either of them."' 21
Of course, the court's discretion is not limitless. As the Ninth Circuit
itself has pointed out, the Mendez-Rodriquez rule "prevents the govern-
ment from determining who will be a helpful witness for the ac-
cused."' 22 The defendant has a right to formulate his defense without
governmental interference with the witnesses.' 23 When in doubt over
the materiality of an alien's testimony, certain guidelines control. If the
evidence discloses that the witness participated in the crime charged, or
was a nonparticipating eyewitness from a sufficiently proximate van-
tage point to the offense, the alien "is a material witness and the de-
fendant has demonstrated a reasonable possibility he could, if
available, give evidence which would exonerate him."' 24
The Mendez-Rodriquez problem is not unique to the Ninth Circuit.
The Second Circuit seems to adhere to the Mendez-Rodriquez guide-
lines in examining cases for governmental fault in failing to retain a
needed witness, 25 the Seventh Circuit appears to have gone slightly
beyond Mendez-Rodriquez,'26 and the Fifth Circuit seems to have
120. United States v. Verduzco-Macicas, 463 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
883 (1972).
121. United States v. Lomeli-Garnica, 495 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1974). As a practical mat-
ter, taking an alien into custody when there is no apparent reason to distrust him after his past
cooperation might well turn him into a very unhappy and uncooperative witness-a situation
hardly supportive of our system of justice and contrary to the purpose of material witness laws.
See United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
122. United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1974). See People v. Mejia, 57
Cal. App. 3d 574, 581, 129 Cal. Rptr. 192, 196 (1976).
123. United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1974). When aliens are confined,
courts have approved parole and farm-out methods of retention. Illegal aliens thus can be kept in
non-prison environments before trial by placing them in local farms where they can earn wages.
See United States v. Verduzo-Macias 463 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883
(1972); United States v. Winnie Mae Mfg. Co., 451 F. Supp. 642, 650 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
124. People v. Mejia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 574, 580, 129 Cal. Rptr. 192, 196 (1976) (citing Williams
v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 412, 423-24, 112 Cal. Rptr. 485, 492 (1974)).
125. See Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618,623-24 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929
(1979).
126. See United States v. Calzada, 579 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (7th Cir. 1978). To overturn a
conviction, the court does not require that prosecutorial "bad faith" be shown in the disappear-
ance of the material witness. Nor does the court require defendant to show prejudice to his case
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avoided the issue.127
H. Suits for Money Damages
Detained material witnesses have not always accepted their hard-
ships without a fight. After release many have sued for damages. A
theory sometimes employed for recovery of money damages is false
imprisonment. Early in this century, such lawsuits met with little suc-
cess. Courts typically found a judge's commitment order to be within
his jurisdiction under the state's material witness law-a protected min-
isterial function, despite claimed irregularities in the proceedings.1 28
Governmental immunity also served to protect municipal corporations
from witness' claims that confinement in inadequate facilities damaged
their health. 129
As constitutional theory advanced, civil actions by material witnesses
became more frequent. In the 1940's courts began to approve actions
by jailed witnesses for abuses in the detention process. One court re-
fused to bar a detainee's recovery of damages for unlawful restraint,
even though she had accepted a witness fee. 130 Another court specifi-
cally upheld plaintiff's complaint charging defendants with "malicious
action in causing plaintiff to be held to bail as a witness.' 3' Whether
"designated as malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, false
imprisonment, or false arrest,' 1 32 the action would lie.
In a 1977 damages action, plaintiff-witnesses brought suit under the
Federal Civil Rights Act133 against the public defender and state's at-
torney, claiming that defendants arranged for their arrest and incarcer-
ation without bond or a hearing. 134 The court dismissed the action,
explaining that defendants had acted within the scope of their normal
functions and, therefore, possessed qualified immunity for their acts. 3-
arising from the government's violation of his right to compulsory process by deporting eyewit-
nesses to the crime with which he is charged.
127. See Uribe v. United States, 529 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1976).
128. On governmental immunity, see Fawcet v. Linthecum, 7 Ohio C.C. 141 (1893).
129. See Watkins v. Freeholders of Atlantic Co., 73 NJ.L. 213, 62 A. 1134 (1906).
130. Hadler v. Rhyner, 244 Wis. 448, 12 N.W.2d 693 (1944).
131. McGrath v. Keenan, 24 NJ. Misc. 121, 122, 46 A.2d 725, 726 (Essex County C.P. 1946).
132. Id. at 123, 46 A.2d at 726.
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976).
134. Beaver v. Carey, 426 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
135. Cf Allison v. County of Ventura, 68 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 137 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (1977)




I1. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTIONS: STATE LAWS
A. Confining the Witness
The detention of material witnesses has long been the object of legis-
lative treatment. Nearly all states and the federal government have en-
acted provisions dealing with pretrial confinement of material
witnesses. In every state except Indiana'36 and West Virginia, 137 a pro-
spective witness can be brought before a judge on application of coun-
sel, generally the prosecutor. Typically, the matter will be heard by a
magistrate, who determines the importance of the witness to the case
and gives the witness the option of posting some form of bail or recog-
nizance, either personal or with sureties. If the witness must post bail
but refuses or fails to do so, he can be confined until he has given his
testimony or the case is dismissed. Several states provide detailed pro-
cedures, limitations, and safeguards for application of their material
witness systems. Systems often do not become activated unless a cer-
tain type of offense is committed, usually a felony 38 or a major
crilme. 13
9
A critical stage in the material witness process is the arrest phase.
Several states grant police officers broad authority to arrest material
witnesses. 140 One state statutorily limits the power of arrest to instances
in which police have reasonable grounds to believe that the person was
present at a crime. 14 1 Another state requires probable cause to believe
that a person is a necessary and material witness and might be unavail-
able later for service of a subpoena.' 42 A warrant for the arrest of the
rant for patent irregularities). But see Garitt v. Sorenson, No. 2478 (ED. Wash. Feb. 18, 1970)
(damages of $500 granted to witness held 36 days).
136. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-9-3 to -4 (Burns 1979).
137. See W. VA. CODE § 62-IC-15 (1977).
138. See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 835-2(b)(3), -2(c)(2) (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 804.11, .23
(West 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 49 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
507 (1943); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 620.20(2)(c), .20(3)(b) (McKinney 1971).
139. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.15 (West 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-3 (West 1971).
140. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-23 (1979); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 15, § 257 (West Supp.
1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 597:22 (Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-803(g) (1978); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 274 (West 1969); PA. R. CRIM. PRoc. 4017. See also State v. Hand, 101 N.J.
Super. 43, 56, 242 A.2d 888, 895 (1968) (recognizing common-law right to warrantless arrest of
material witness to felony when witness "might be unavailable for service of subpoena").
141. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1910 (1974).
142. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.11 (West 1979), discussed in J. YEAOER & R. CARLSON,
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 845 (1979).
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material witness is not invariably required. 14 3
The right to search a witness incident to arrest is another important
consideration. As declared in State v. Hand,' "Since a search of the
person without a search warrant incident to an arrest is permitted for
the protection of the police. . . it would not seem reasonable to pro-
hibit a search of a person arrested as a material witness."' 45
Most state laws either imply or briefly mention the necessity for a
preliminary hearing on the witness' status in the case. New Hampshire
specifically requires that the witness be brought before a superior court
justice within twenty-four hours after arrest. 146 Oklahoma not only
proscribes unnecessary delay before the witness is taken before a judge,
but also mandates that the witness be advised of his constitutional
rights, "including the reason he is being held in custody, his right to the
aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and of his right to be
released from custody upon entering into a written undertaking."'' 47
Under Alaska law a witness properly committed to jail by a judge has
the right to have his commitment reviewed by the judge forty-eight
hours later.148
In Massachusetts the jailer of a witness detained because of his in-
ability to furnish sureties must notify the chief justice of the superior
court, who in turn must order an inquiry by the district attorney into
the importance of the witness' testimony and the necessity for his de-
tention.149 If the "public interest will not suffer by the release of the
witness on his own recognizance," the chief justice can release him.150
Eight states incorporate methods for release of material witnesses in
their laws.' 5' Alternatives to incarceration include: (1) placing the wit-
143. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.11 (West 1979); State v. Hand, 101 N.J. Super. 43, 242
A.2d 888 (1968). Some states, however, require police to go through a formal process by which a
court must hold extensive hearings and find special circumstances before it can issue a material
witness order authorizing the arrest and detention of a witness. HAwAIn REv. STAT. §§ 835-1 to -5
(1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 620.10-.50 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-803
(1978).
144. 101 N.J. Super. 43, 242 A.2d 888 (1968). See IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.18 (West 1979),
145. 101 N.J. Super. at 55, 242 A.2d at 894 (citing State v. Mark, 46 N.J. 262, 271-72, 216 A.2d
377 (1977)) (footnote omitted).
146. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 597:22 (Supp. 1977).
147. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 719 (West Supp. 1979).
148. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a), .020(0 (Supp. 1979).
149. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 51 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968).
150. Id.
151. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.050 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 804.23, 811.2 (West Supp.




ness "in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to
supervise him"; (2) placing restrictions on his travel, association, or
place of abode during the period of release; (3) requiring the witness to
return to custody after daylight hours on designated conditions;1 52 (4)
requiring the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount or
a bail bond with sufficient surety; and (5) imposing "any other condi-
tion reasonably necessary to assure [the witness'] appearance as re-
quired."1 53
One way to protect witnesses from lengthy detentions is to require
that their depositions be taken as soon as possible after they are jailed.
Twenty states authorize depositions for preserving testimony.1 54 The
possibility of deposition and release avoids excessive infringement of a
witness' rights. Protective possibilities are further enhanced in those
states which have statutorily limited the time after jailing within which
a witness' deposition must be taken. Alaska allows only a "reasonable"
time to take a deposition before the witness must be released, 55 and
Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming allow the prosecutor "no longer
than necessary" to depose the witness.1 56 Other states prescribe specific
day limits. 157
If a witness is forced to endure an extended period of confinement, a
S.C. CODE §§ 17-15-70, -10 (1976); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-43-18, -3 (Spec. Supp. 1978);
VA. CODE §§ 19.2-127, -123 (1975); WASH. SUPER. CT. CPiM. R. 6.13(a), 3.2 (Supp. 1975).
152. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(1) (1972).
153. IOWA CODE ANN. § 811,2(1)(e) (West 1979).
154. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.050 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4083(B) (1978); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-626 (1947); CAL. PENAL CODE § 882 (Deering 1971); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 17;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(3) (West 1973); IDAHO CODE § 19-824 (1979); KAN. STAT. § 22-2805
(1974); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 15, § 258 (West Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276,
§ 50 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 23, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-601
(1979); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 189.040(2)-.040(3) (1973); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 25; N.D. R.
CRiM. P. 46(e); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 15(a); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 23A-43-18 (Spec. Supp. 1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-29 (1978); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIM. R. 6.13(a) (Supp. 1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 969.01(3), 967.04(1) (West 1971); Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 12, Wyo. R. CiM. P. 8(b).
In addition, four states have enacted statutes specifically controlling the admissibility of such dep-
osition at trial. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4083(b) (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-627 (1947); LA.
CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 15, § 259 (West Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 189.040(4) (1973).
155. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.050 (1972).
156. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 17; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-601(2) (1979); Wyo. CONST.
art. I, § 12.
157. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-4083(B), (C) (Spec. Supp. 1978) (three days); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 902.17(3), .17(4) (West 1973) (three days); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 25 (five days);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 969.01(3) (West 1971) (fifteen days). Once the time limit is reached, the wit-
ness must be released without further excuse or delay, regardless of whether the witness' deposi-
tion has been taken. See also MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-203(e), -203(0 (1974)
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number of state laws attempt to guarantee a minimum amount of
safety and comfort. Seven states prohibit witnesses from being jailed
with criminals or criminal suspects.' 58 Delaware affords detained wit-
nesses with special facilities and service. 159 Massachusetts provides the
most comprehensive statutory plan for taking care of detained wit-
nesses. The Commissioner of Corrections is empowered to make
rules relative to the diet, size of cells, amount of liberty and exercise, cor-
respondence, visits and such other matters as he considers necessary regu-
lating the treatment of witnesses held in jail as will secure their clear
distinction and separation from other prisoners so far as possible, consis-
tent with their safe custody and the prevention of tampering with their
testimony.' 60
Moreover, a police officer who allows a witness to be handcuffed to,
confined with, or transported in a vehicle with an accused criminal is
subject to a twenty-dollar fine. 1 6 1
B. Fee Legislation
To protect a material witness from incurring an extreme financial
burden during his detention, at least fourteen states have enacted pro-
visions granting fees, but the size of the fees vary widely: 500 per day
maximum (North Dakota), 16  $1.50 per day minimum, (Massachu-
(seven days subject to judicial extension, but no special mention of deposition); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-803(c) (1978) (20 days, plus single five-day renewal, but no mention of deposition).
A special provision mandating that witnesses not be detained unreasonably long exists in four-
teen states. Three of these states establish this prohibition by statute. See KAN. STAT. § 22-2805
(1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.494(2) (1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1210 (Supp. 1979). Four
others use a rule of criminal procedure. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 46(b); Ky. R. CgiM. P. 7.06; ME. R.
CRIM. P. 46(b); R.I. SUPER. CT. CRiM. R. 46(b), DIST. CT. CRIM. R. 46(b). The remaining seven
states protect witnesses by means of a constitutional provision against unreasonable detentions.
See CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; CoLo. CONsT. art. II, § 17; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; N.Y. CoNsT. art.
I, § 5; N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 15.
158. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 52 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 163 (West 1971); N.D. CON T. art. I, § 6; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.18
(Page 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 719 (West Supp. 1979); Wyo. CoNsT. art. I, § 12,
159. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6526(b) (1974). In Washington the witness will get "food
and lodging," WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.52.040 (Supp. 1978), in New Jersey he can expect to
be "comfortably lodged and provided for, and not further restricted of [his] liberty than is neces-
sary for [his] detention," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-3 (West 1971), and in New Hampshire he will
receive the "net proceeds of his labor" while in jail, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 619:23 (1974).
160. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 52 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968).
161. Id. § 54.
162. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-03-24 (1976).
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setts),163 $2.00 per day (Connecticut), 16 $3.00 per day (New York and
Pennsylvania),' 65 $7.50 per day (Oregon), 166 $10.00 per day (Mary-
land), 167 $20.00 per day (Hawaii), 16 and $25.00 per day (Ohio). 16 9 The
remaining states do not specify an amount.170
C. Progressive Concepts
Several jurisdictions have developed commendable legislation in the
area of material witness detention.' 7 1 Florida permits a witness who is
unable to give security for his appearance to apply to the court for a
reduction in security.' 72 Arizona and Florida provide a procedure by
which a magistrate, after examination of a witness on oath, can make a
special finding that the witness is unable to give security.'73 Within
three days from entry of the finding, the detained witness will be de-
posed in the presence of both the state and the criminal defendant. 74
At the completion of the examination the witness must be dis-
charged.' 75 The deposition is admissible in evidence at trial, although
Florida requires the defendant's consent before the deposition can be
admitted on behalf of the state. 17 6 If the detained witness is not condi-
tionally examined within three days, both states require that he be dis-
charged. 77
North Carolina uses a procedure under which it obtains the attend-
ance of witnesses through a material witness order 178 issued by a judge
when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person whom the
163. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 30 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968).
164. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-24 (1979) (plus legal fees as witness).
165. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 620.80 (McKinney 1971); cf. Appendix A (New Jersey provi-
sions).
166. OR. REV. STAT. § 136.615 (1977).
167. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-203(h) (1974).
168. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-8 (1976).
169. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.18 (Page 1975).
170. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(5) (West 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.6 (West 1979);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 719 (West Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.52.040 (Supp.
1978).
171. See, eg., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4081 to -4084 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 902.15,
.17 (West 1973).
172. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(2) (West 1973).
173. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4083(B) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(3) (West 1973).
174. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4083(B) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(3) (West 1973).
175. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4083(B) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(3) (West 1973).
176. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4083(b) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(3) (West 1973).
177. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4083(c) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 902.17(4) (West 1973).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-803 (1978).
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State or a defendant desires to call as a witness in a pending criminal
proceeding possesses information material to the determination of the
proceeding and may not be amenable or responsive to a subpoena at a
time when his attendance will be sought.' 79
Upon motion for a material witness order, the witness "must be given
reasonable notice, opportunity to be heard and present evidence, and
the right of representation by counsel at a hearing on the motion."' 180
"The order must be based on findings of fact supporting its issu-
ance." 18
Hawaii and New York also base their witness detention systems on
material witness orders.'8 2 For an order to issue, there must be reason-
able cause to believe that a person will not be "amenable or responsive
to a subpoena at a time when his attendance will be sought."'183 An
order also cannot issue unless either an indictment or a felony com-
plaint has been filed, or a grand jury proceeding has been com-
menced. 8 4  "[Tihe court must inform [the witness] of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, and that he is entitled to a prompt hearing
upon the issue of whether he should be adjudged a material wit-
179. Id. § 15A-803(a).
180. Id. § 15A-803(d).
181. Id. The power to issue a material witness order is limited to superior court judges after
the initiation of criminal proceedings, and to district court judges "only at the time that a defend-
ant is bound over to superior court at a probable-cause hearing." Id. § 15A-803(b). The life of
the order may vary, but it cannot exceed 20 days when a material witness is incarcerated. Id.
§ 15A-803(c). However, "upon review a superior court judge in his discretion may renew an order
one or more times for periods not to exceed five days each." Id. A superior court judge also may
modify or vacate an order "upon a showing of new or changed facts or circumstances by the
witness, the State, or any defendant." Id. § 15A-803(f). A court issuing a material witness order
may either (1) direct the release of the witness by choosing among a range of flexible methods of
release, id §§ 15A-534, -803(e)(1), or (2) detain the witness. Id. § 15A-803(e)(2).
182. See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 835-1 to -8 (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 620.10-.80 (Mc-
Kinney 1971).
183. HAwAii REV. STAT. § 835-2(a)(2) (1976); N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAW § 620.20.1(b) (McKin-
ney 1971).
184. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-2(b) (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.20.2 (McKinney
1971). These circumstances limit the courts that can issue material orders, which in turn affects
the time length of such orders. HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 835-2(c), -2(d) (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 620.20.3, .4 (McKinney 1971). Upon written application to the appropriate court and
proof of the "reasonable cause" requirement, the prospective witness may be compelled to appear
by means of personal service of the order or, after being taken into custody and brought before the
court, by a police officer. HAwAII REv. STAT. § 835-3 (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.30
(McKinney 1971).
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ness."18'  The witness is entitled to counsel and may be assigned a law-
yer if financially unable to retain one.'86 At the hearing, the order
applicant (often the prosecutor) "has the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence all facts essential to support a material wit-
ness order."' 87 The prospective witness can testify in his own behalf
and call witnesses through use of the court's subpoena power. 188 Hear-
say evidence is admissible."8 9 After the court determines that a mate-
rial witness order is warranted, it may issue the order adjudging the
prospective witness a material witness and fixing bail to secure his fu-
ture attendance. 19° If bail is posted and approved by the court, the
witness must be released; if bail is not posted or approved by the court,
the witness must be committed to the sheriffs custody.' 9 ' Finally, both
states grant daily fees to confined witnesses, amounting to twenty dol-
lars per day in Hawaii 192 and three dollars per day in New York. 193
D. Laws in Need of Reform
Notwithstanding the legislative activity just noted, many state legis-
latures have remained dormant in reforming their material witness
laws. Numerous states' statutes contain little in the way of procedural
or substantive protections for detained witnesses.' 94 A review of those
185. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-4(a) (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.40.1 (McKinney
1971).
186. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-4(a) (1976); N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 620.40.1 (McKinney
1971).
187. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 835-5(a)(1) (1976); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 620.50.1(a) (McKin-
ney 1971).
188. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-5(a)(2) to -5(a)(3) (1976); N.Y. CRAM. PROC. LAW
§ 620.50.1(b)-.1(c) (McKinney 1971).
189. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-5(a)(4) (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.50.1(d) (McKin-
ney 1971).
190. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-5(b) (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.50.2 (McKinney
1971).
191. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-5(c) (1976); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 620.50.3 (McKinney
1971). At any time upon application of the witness or the order applicant, the court may inquire
' whether by reason of new or changed facts or circumstances the material witness order is no
longer necessary or warranted, or, if it is, whether the original bail currently appears excessive."
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-6(a) (1976); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 620.60.1 (McKinney 1971). The
court may then enter a new order modifying the old order, if appropriate. HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 835-6(a) (1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.60.1 (McKinney 1971).
192. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 835-8 (1976).
193. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.80 (McKinney 1971).
194. See ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 14-6-3(4), tit. 15, §§ 15-11-12 to -14 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 109-3(a), -3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 765.29, .30, 767.34 (MICH.
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statutes which have persisted in unrevised form and which reflect scant
attention to individual liberties suggests a certain pattern. After a crim-
inal defendant has been arrested, each statute requires a material wit-
ness to enter into some form of recognizance 195 or bail. The witness is
committed to jail on his refusal to enter into the required undertaking,
although the term "refusal" is applied broadly to include witnesses who
are unable to post the necessary security. 19 6
These state laws reflect an antiquated approach, affording few safe-
guards to witnesses. In each of these states, statutory provisions estab-
lish a quick, easy procedure for binding witnesses to judicial control
and holding them in jail. The period of confinement is often open-
ended. The state need make only minimal showings in procuring a
witness' commitment, and the witness has no special statutory proce-
dure at his command under the state's witness laws for obtaining his
prompt release. Statutory reference to access to counsel is virtually
nonexistent. Illinois and Michigan even grant coroners a broad power
to jail witnesses during a murder inquest.' 97 Such laws strictly delimit
the only safeguard existing in these outmoded statutes, that of judicial
oversight and discretion.
Legislators in the several jurisdictions adhering to these outdated
witness laws will have to dust off rather old books to find the origins of
their statutes. Many of these laws can be traced to territorial or original
state legislation dating as far back as 1818 (Missouri), 9 ' 1827 (Ill-
STAT. ANN. §§ 28.916, .917, .974, .975 (1978)); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.10, 629.54, ,55 (West
1947); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-7 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 544.420-.440, Mo. Sup. CT. R.
23.08-.09 (1978); NaB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-507, -508 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.607, .609, .613
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1122 to -1127 (1975) (Tennessee also has a statute that allows a
court to release a witness who has been detained unreasonably long. Id. § 40-1210 (Supp. 1979));
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6605 (1974). See also Appendix A.
195. See ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 15-11-12 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.10, 629.54 (West
1947); Mo. REv. STAT. § 544.420 (1978); NaB. REV. STAT. § 29-507 (1975); OR. RaV. STAT.
§§ 136.607, .609(1) (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1122 to -1124 (1975).
196. See ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 15-11-14 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.55 (West 1947); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 544.440 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-508 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.613 (1977);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1126 (1975). Both the Alabama and Tennessee laws specifically provide
that a witness may be jailed ifhe either refuses orfails to enter into the required undertaking. See
also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 767.35
(MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.975 (1978)); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-7 (1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 6605 (1974). See also note 27 supra and accompanying text.
197. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 31, §§ 17-18 (Smith-Hurd 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 979.11
(West Supp. 1979). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7(5) (1978).




nois),199 1846 (Michigan),2"° 1852 (Alabama),"' 1857 (Mississippi), 20 2
1858 (Minnesota and Tennessee),2 °3 and 1864 (Oregon).2° Many of
those relics remain unchanged since their original passage. Missouri's
present statute, for example, is nearly identical to the 1818 territorial
law from which it originated.20 5
IV. FEDERAL PATTERNS
A. Federal Law and Practice
As recently as 1978, Congress revised federal material witness proce-
dures.u°6 The federal revisions incorporated several progressive aspects
from various state laws into the federal material witness pattern. As a
result, no single federal material witness statute governs the material
witness process. Even the complex of laws and rules20 that bear on the
problem leave gaps in coverage. None of the federal provisions, for
example, authorizes arrest of material witnesses; instead, this power
arises by implication2 8
The federal material witness process begins upon the filing of an affi-
davit that a person is "material" in a criminal proceeding and a show-
ing "that it may become impracticable to secure his presence by
subpoena."' 9 Once the witness has been taken into custody, a judicial
officer imposes conditions of release from a range of release alterna-
tives, 210 among which is holding the witness to bail. A witness may not
be detained for inability to comply with any condition of release as
199. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(a), -3(d) (Smith-Hurd) (1970).
200. See MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.916, .917, .974, .975 (1978).
201. See ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 15-11-12 to -14 (1975).
202. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-7 (1972).
203. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.10, 629.54, .55 (West 1947); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1122
to -1127 (1975).
204. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 136.607, .609, .613 (1973).
205. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 544.420-.440 (1978) with Mo. Territorial Laws ch. 223, § 4
(1824).
206. See note 216 infra.
207. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3149 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15, 46.
208. See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Feingold,
416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra. For reference
to a statutory arrest pattern, see note 142 supra.
209. 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1976). See id §§ 3146, 3149 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a).
210. Release alternatives include: (1) placing the witness "in the custody of a designated per-
son or organization agreeing to supervise him"; (2) placing restrictions on his "travel, association,
or place of abode ... during the period of release"; (3) "requiring the execution of an appear-
ance bond in a specified amount" or a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties; (4) "requiring
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long as his testimony can be adequately "secured by deposition, and
further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice." 21
Provisions for the taking of depositions have been carefully detailed,
including delay of a witness' release for a "reasonable period of time"
to depose him. 212 Supervision of detained witnesses comes under the
court's jurisdiction, and the government's attorney must make biweekly
reports to the court listing each witness (as well as each defendant)
"who has been held in custody. . . in excess of ten days" and stating
"the reasons why such witness should not be released with or without
the taking of his deposition. 213
Since 1853 detained witnesses have been entitled to one dollar for
every day spent in jail awaiting trial.2 14 In 1973 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute over claims that the one dol-
lar per day compensation violated both the fifth amendment guarantees
of just compensation and due process and the thirteenth amendment
prohibition against involuntary servitude.215 On October 27, 1978,
Congress approved an amendment raising detained witness fees to
thirty dollars per day, the same amount received by an ordinary wit-
ness for daily attendance at court.216 Congress considered that amount,
which translates into an annual wage of $7500, to be the minimal ac-
ceptable level of payment for each day of detention.217 This amend-
ment specifically excludes detained illegal aliens from recovering such
fees while awaiting the prosecution of their smugglers.218
that the person return to custody after specified hours"; and (5) imposing "any other condition
deemed reasonably necessary to assurance appearance as required." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(I)-(5)
(1976).
211. Id. § 3149 (1976).
212. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a).
213. FED. R. CRIM. PROc. 46(g).
214. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 3, 10 Stat. 167 (1853) (amended 1978).
215. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973). See notes 85-88, 106 supra.
216. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821(b), (d)(4) (West Supp. 1979). This amount is in addition to a "sub-
sistence" allowance for each confined witness.
217. As noted during congressional deliberations, "[Piresent statutes restrict the category of
witnesses upon whom courts may impose the burdens of incarcerations but do not provide reason-
able compensation to those upon whom the burdens fall." H.R. REP. No. 95-1651, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4631, 4634. This amendment "would
not only provide more reasonable compensation for the inconvenience and financial hardships
which detention entails but would eliminate the peculiarities of the system of compensation which
the Supreme Court mandated by its decision in Hurtado." Id.
218. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e) (West Supp. 1979). See H.R. REP. No. 95-1651, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4631, 4634, 4636. See notes 111-16
supra and accompanying text.
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B. Using the Laws: How Many Cases?
Statistical data relating to material witnesses in federal courts have
recently begun to appear. One source, the Annual Reports of the Di-
rector of the United States Courts, reflects the dramatic upsurge in the
use of material witness laws by federal authorities. Illustration No. 1
reflects the markedly increased flow of material witness proceedings in
federal magistrate courts in recent years.21 9
ILLUSTRATION NO. 1
MATERIAL WITNESS BAIL PROCEEDINGS
HANDLED BY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES
















219. See [1978] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 140 [hereinafter cited as
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A breakdown of these statistics indicates that although material witness
bail proceedings are more frequent in those areas burdened with illegal
alien problems (like the Southwest), they are commonplace throughout
the country.22°
The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts also has collected data on the representation of material wit-
nesses by private lawyers. Illustration No. 2 depicts the number of ma-
terial witnesses represented by private counsel from 1972 through
1976.221
ILLUSTRATION NO. 2
NUMBER OF MATERIAL WITNESSES











1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977*
FISCAL YEAR
* As of December 31, 1977. Complete figures unavailable beyond 1976.
At first glance, the preceding figures appear to be inconclusive. The
sharp increase, then the drop in numbers of privately represented wit-
[1978] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.]; [1977] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 292 [herein-
after cited as [1977] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.]; [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP.
423 [hereinafter cited as [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.].
220. See [1978] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 219, at A-142 to -143; [1977] ADMIN. OFFICE
REP., supra note 219, at 493-95; [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., SUpra note 219, at 423-26.
221. [1977] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 219, at 540; [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., sUpra
note 219, at 465; [1975] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 552 [hereinafter cited as
[1975] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.]; [1974] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 593 [herein-
after cited as [1974] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.]; [1973] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP.
529 [hereinafter cited as [1973] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.]; [1972] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS




nesses from 1973 through 1975 perhaps can be attributed to increased
legal services representation of material witnesses, for which the Direc-
tor has included no data. Throughout the country state and federal
public defender programs continue to grow. A breakdown of these sta-
tistics again shows that the material witness problem is widespread
across the country, particularly (albeit not exclusively) in those states
which are a mecca for illegal aliens.2 22 Identical results obtain from
statistics on the amount of payments to private attorneys in material
witness cases, as portrayed in Illustration No. 3.223
Witnesses are increasingly hailed before courts in bail proceedings.
Because federal law is more consistent than state law in regularly pro-
viding counsel, representation of witnesses is an expanding expense
item.22 4 Precise data on how many witnesses are jailed each year for
inability to post bail is not centrally collected. The increasing magni-
tude of such jailings, however, is derivable from another source--cost
figures on jailed witnesses. Witnesses receive a set fee for time spent in
jail. Under the law applicable in 1976, 1977, and 1978, witnesses drew
one dollar per day for each day of pretrial, pretestimony confinement.
The fee paid to a witness who spent fifty days in jail waiting for the
trial to start, for example, would amount to fifty dollars. Thus, identi-
fying the dollar amounts paid witnesses for pretrial confinement in a
222. [1977] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 219, at 542-53; [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra
note 219, at 466-73; [1975] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 221, at 553-63; [1974] ADMIN. OFFICE
REP,, supra note 221, at 594-605; [1973] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 221, at 521-31; [1972]
ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 221, at 489-93.
223. [1977] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 219, at 540; [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra
note 219, at 465; [1975] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 221, at 552; [1974] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.,
supra note 221, at 593; [1973] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 221, at 520; [1972] ADMIN. OFFICE
REP., supra note 221, at 488.
224. Other data collected by the Administrative Office Director substantiates the point. Each
report contains tables of claims for compensation in excess of $250 for extended or complex repre-
sentation by appointed private attorneys. The first such statistic dealing with a material witness
case occurred in 1973, when a claim was paid in the Federal District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri. [1973] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 221, at 551. The next claim did not arise
until 1975, when attorney's fees of $292.50 and $567.50 were paid out of the Southern District of
California, and $300 issued from the Western District of Louisiana. [1975] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.,
supra note 221, at 586-87. In 1976 a single claim for $630 was settled, [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE REP.,
supra note 219, at 487, and in the following year four claims were discharged, two out of the
District of New Jersey for $450 and $1245 and two out of the Southern District of California for
$290 and $324, [1977] ADMIN. OFFICE REP., supra note 219, at 577. Although these statistics are
limited, they demonstrate that material witness proceedings are becoming more expensive. In
1978 more money was spent in jailing federal material witnesses than had been spent in the previ-
ous two years combined. See Illustration No. 4. The problem, however, is not only one of money.
After translating these dollars into days spent in jail, the loss of time becomes apparent.
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given year will provide an insight into the number of days logged in
custody by jailed witnesses. Illustration No. 4 indicates the large
number of days spent in confinement; Illustration No. 5 provides a
breakdown of fees paid to detained witnesses in each federal district
around the country.225  From these illustrations, nearly 200,000 wit-
ness-days were spent in jail in 1978.226 Apparently, more detention is
planned (Illustration No. 6).227
225. The authors express particular thanks to the Department of Justice. Upon special re-
quest, the Department released data on the amount of detained witness fees paid during the fiscal
years 1976-1978. These fees were paid at the rate of one dollar per day according to the federal
witness fees statute then in effect. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976) (amended 1978). For revisions in these
provisions, see note 216 supra and accompanying text. These fees represent only the period of jail
confinement before testifying. Letter to Ronald L. Carlson from Charles R. Neill, Director, Fi-
nancial Management Staff, Office of Management and Finance, United States Department of Jus-
tice, May 18, 1979, on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly. Thereafter, the witness
is entitled to twenty dollars per day for each day's attendance at court. See Hurtado v. United
States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973); notes 85-88, 106, 215 supra and accompanying text.
226. The figures in Illustration No. 4 may have been enhanced by the alien witness problem.
Often, witnesses are held at the request of the prosecution to convict the accused smuggler. An-
other aspect of this problem is discussed in detail in notes 111-116 supra. In just three counties in
Arizona, for example, 540 illegal aliens were detained as witnesses in one year for a total of 23,520
days. MacNitt, U.S. Will Test Rulings on Alien Witness Detention, Tucson Citizen, Apr. 14, 1978,
§ A, at 3, col. 1. These jailings in Pima, Santa Cruz, and Cochise counties cost taxpayers $500,000.
Nine times out of ten the testimony of the detained witness was not needed because the smuggling
defendant pled guilty. In numerous instances the detained alien spent much more time in jail
than did the smugglers, because some smugglers made bail and received probation. Id.
One expert indicates that the average confinement of an alien witness is about 43 days. Tele-
phone Interview by Mark Voelpel with Attorney Roger Wolf, Tucson, Arizona (March 2, 1979).
In United States v. Hernandez-Villa, No. CR79-24 TUC-JAW (D. Ariz. 1979), Mr. Wolf was
appointed to represent material witnesses and moved to have them deposed and released pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1976). The government resisted, urging that the witnesses should testify in
person for the jury to see them. In addition, the government expressed concern regarding defend-
ant's confrontation rights, citing United States v. Provencio, 554 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1977), and
United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1971). On the confrontation point, see
authorities cited note 232 infra.
The authors are not unaware of the difficulties imposed on the government by Mendez-Rodri-
guez. See note Ill supra and accompanying text. There has been some commendable softening
of the rule. See United States v. Lomeli-Garnica, 495 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974); cases cited notes
114-121 supra and accompanying text. In addition, government authorities indicate that deposi-
tions meet with less resistance from defense attorneys when videotape equipment is available. In
Phoenix the installation of such equipment should improve the situation. See MacNitt supra. In
other parts of the country, whether in cases dealing with alien witnesses or others, it would appear
that liberal use of the commendable federal law on depositions, see notes 209-13 supra and ac-
companying text, might reduce the number of days witnesses are confined.
227. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1651, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprintedin [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4631, 4638. As revised, federal provisions grant witnesses thirty dollars per day for
pretrial confinement. See note 216 supra and accompanying text. These provisions, however,
specifically exclude detained alien witnesses from recovering such fees while awaiting the prosecu-
tion of their smugglers. See note 218 supra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
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ILLUSTRATION NO. 4
FEES PAID TO DETAINED MATERIAL WITNESSES,
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976), AT THE
RATE OF $1.00 PER DAY OF CONFINEMENT
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ILLUSTRATION NO. 6
ESTIMATED FEES TO BE PAID DETAINED FEDERAL WITNESSES,
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976) AS AMENDED IN 1978,
IN COMPENSATION FOR TIME SPENT IN CONFINEMENT
























Through the preceding statistics this article has sought to provide
graphic illustrations of the scope of the material witness problem. All
statistical indicators suggest that the material witness process is being
used more today than ever before in this century. It is an expensive
procedure. It exacts costs in terms of time allocated on magistrate court
dockets, efforts by private and government attorneys, money spent by
the federal government in attorney and witness fees, and time sub-
tracted from the lives of detained witnesses. Moreover, these statistics
depict only the federal side of material witness practice. No central
data is available to describe comprehensively the situation in the vari-
ous states. If such data were available, it would further reveal the im-
minent and widespread impact on courts and individuals of the
practice of jailing material witnesses.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Unless there is a need to hold the witness for another reason,228 ex-
tended detention simply to preserve his testimony for trial is unwar-
ranted. At least with witnesses other than illegal aliens, there are
significant provisions of law designed to secure the presence of wit-
nesses at trial. Witnesses often will respond to a simple subpoena or
other order to appear.229 In addition, one moving in interstate com-
merce to avoid giving testimony can be apprehended to insure his pres-
ence at trial.23°
Even if the witness disappears and his live presence cannot be se-
cured, nothing in the law prevents the use of meaningful substitutes for
live testimony. Depositions provide one answer. For those attorneys
228. Such reasons might include protecting the witness from physical harm and affording the
defendant an opportunity to interview the witness. See notes 111-16 supra and accompanying
text.
229. Several studies of criminal defendants indicate that fears that people released on their
own recognizance would not return are largely unjustified. See, e.g., Freed & Wald, Bail in the
UnitedStates: 1964, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 62 (1964) (people
released on recognizance have high rate of return).
230. Interstate rendition of witnesses is assisted by the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance
of Witnesses. 11 U.L.A. 5 (1974). In addition, a federal warrant for unlawful flight to avoid
testifying is possible. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976). See Carlson, supra note 5, at 17. As noted earlier,
see notes 226-27 supra, the illegal alien presents a special problem. Although the Federal Fugitive
Felon Act might be used against an alien who leaves one state for another to avoid giving testi-
mony, his return to a country like Mexico poses powerful difficulties. Extradition is reserved for
severe crimes, and the practical problems of locating the fugitive alien witness are immense.
Comment, supra note 109.
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who want to insure that the jury has an opportunity to observe the
witness' demeanor, video tape affords a solution. United States v. Ben-
field231 suggests the correctness of using a properly prepared videotape
deposition of an absent, unavailable witness.2
32
Witness detention laws have come under constitutional attack.
233
Although such challenges have been largely rebuffed in the past, cer-
tain practices by state authorities under material witness statutes have
been held unconstitutional.234  As legal scrutiny of material witness
laws continues, challenges to various aspects of the incarceration proc-
ess undoubtedly will increase. Denial of representation, confinement
of witnesses with defendants, paucity of witness fees, lack of speedy
appeal provisions, and detentions without maximum time limits all
represent features of a practice virtually certain to be attacked.
235  If
231. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). Although the case barred trial use of a video-taped deposi-
tion, a key factor in the court's decision was defendant's physical absence from the room where
the deposition was taken. Though emphasizing that right to confrontation requires cross-exami-
nation and a face-to-face meeting, the court noted: "[W]hen a witness is actually unavailable at
trial his prior testimony may be admitted if sufficient indicia of reliability are present." Id. at 820
(collecting cases and citing FED. R. EvID. 804(a)). As observed by one student commentator:
The decision in Benfieldis also important because the court expressly approved the use
in criminal trials of video-taped depositions that comply with the terms of Rule IS and
allow the defendant to participate actively in the proceeding. Commentators generally
agree that a jury is capable of satisfactorily viewing a deponent's demeanor through
video tape, and the court's decision exhibits a willingness to accept this proposition.
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 1106, 1119 (footnotes omitted).
232. On the propriety of using prior sworn testimony over claims of confrontation rights, see
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (prior trial testimony of victim witness); United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976) (grand jury testimony of absent witness admissable), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Other cases are collected at Carlson, supra note 5, at 19 n.65. On the
use of video-taped material at trial, see Comment, ideotape Depositions: An 41lernative to te
Incarceration of41ien Material Witness, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 376, 391-97 (1975) (overcoming
confrontation objections); Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 333 (1974) (admissibility in criminal trial). See
also Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1212 (1977) (closed-circuit television); Annot., 16 A.L.R. Fed. 969 (1973)
(deposition by other than stenographic means).
233. See cases cited notes 89-94 supra. Unfortunately, Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578
(1973), failed to provide a broad constitutional test for material witness laws. Because Hurtado
did not broadly attack the constitutionality ofjailing witnesses, the Court confined its scrutiny to
the pay provisions. See notes 85, 106 supra and accompanying text.
234. In Zn re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977), the court refused to declare Ne-
braska's material witness statutes unconstitutional. Emphasizing the basic unfairness when liberty
is taken without adequate notice, however, the court ruled that "the entire custodial restraint of
the petitioners has been at odds with the Constitution." Id. at 1216. See notes 7, 91, 98-99 supra
and accompanying text.
235. On witness fees, see cases cited notes 95-108 supra and statutes cited notes 162-70 spra.
As to the appeal problem, see 27 OKLA. L. REV. 297, 301 (1974). On unsegregated confinement,
see note 4 supra. Courts have approved work-release programs for witnesses, allowing them to be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss1/5
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not unconstitutional, these aspects of current law most certainly are so-
cially undesirable and legally unsound.
To assist in providing an appropriate solution, the authors have pro-
posed a model statute, which appears in Appendix B to this article and
incorporates certain safeguards not presently contained in numerous
state laws. Provisions for the deposing of witnesses appear.236 So do
sections on representation by counsel, provision of separate confine-
ment, payment of witness fees, and right of speedy appeal.
Humane provision for witnesses who are arrested and incarcerated is
essential to the American legal process. Inappropriate suppressions of
liberty should not be tolerated by our courts in the future. Modem
concepts of due process of law demand statutory reforms of material
witness laws as well as responsible actions under them.
"farmed out." United States v. Verduzeo-Macias, 463 F.2d 105 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 409 U.S.
883 (1972); Comment supra note 109, at 186.
236. Some states already incorporate the deposition feature. See notes 154-57 supra and ac-
companying text. Other commentators have urged it. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 232; Com-
ment, supra note 109, at 191; Comment, Pretrial Detention of Witnesses, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 700,
723 (1969); 40 NEB. L. REv. 503, 515 (1961). For the law on depositions, see references cited note
232 supra.
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ALA. CODE §§ 15-11-12 to -14, 14-6-3 (1975). The court may confine prose-
cution witnesses, including minors and married women, in the county jail
upon their failure to enter $100 recognizance in any criminal case. The court
may require a larger security when the prospective witness resides less than
fifty miles from the place of examination and inside the state.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.30.020, .050-.060 (1972 & Supp. 1979). A judicial of-
ficer may subject material witnesses to the same conditions of release as crimi-
nal defendants: placement in the custody of a designated supervising person
or organization; restrictions on travel, association, or place of residence; return
to custody in the evenings; or execution of an appearance bond. The state may
detain a witness unable to comply with a condition of release only for a rea-
sonable time to take his deposition. A person wilfully failing to appear after
release forfeits any security pledged for his release and is subject to either a
$1,000 fine, imprisonment for a year, or both.
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4081 to -4084 (1978). A magistrate may com-
mit for a maximum of three days any witness unable to post the required se-
curity. During this period, the state or the defendant may conditionally
examine the witness.
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-623 to -627 (1977). Although specific provisions for
incarceration do not appear, a magistrate may require material witnesses for
both the state and the defendant to appear and testify or forfeit not less than
$100. If the witness refuses to testify or if it appears that flight is imminent, the
state or the defendant may examine the witness and have the resulting tran-
script admitted into evidence. The magistrate may reopen the preliminary
hearing to hear and preserve the testimony of the witness.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 878-882 (Deering 1970 &
Supp. 1979). The magistrate may require a material witness, including an in-
fant or married woman, to enter a written undertaking to the effect that the
witness will testify in court or forfeit $500. The magistrate must commit to
prison any witness who fails to comply. The magistrate may allow on behalf
of the state a conditional examination of a material witness who is unable to
meet security, but then must discharge him. The magistrate cannot confine the
witness in any room with criminals nor unreasonably detain any witness.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 17. The state may imprison witnesses unable to give
security only as long as is necessary to take their deposition.
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-23 to -25 (1979). The clerk of any court may issue
a warrant for the arrest of any witness upon receipt of a written complaint
from any state attorney alleging that the witness is material and may disappear
or otherwise fail to appear as a witness. The person serving the warrant must
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bring the witness before a judge for the county from which the warrant issued
as soon as is reasonably possible for the purpose of examination. The judge
may require the witness to enter into a recognizance and may commit the wit-
ness for failure to do so. The state cannot confine witnesses with criminals,
and must pay them regular witness fees plus two dollars per day during con-
finement.
DEL. CODE A-N. tit. 11, §§ 1910, 6526(b) (1974); CT. C.P.R. 46(b). A peace
officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed
and that a person is a witness to the crime may ask that person for identifica-
tion. If the witness refuses to identify himself, the officer may take him to a
magistrate who may either commit the witness until he does identify himself
or require him to furnish bond. When it appears that it may become impracti-
cable to secure a material witness' presence by subpoena, the court or magis-
trate may commit the witness upon failure to give bail, but only for a
reasonable length of time. The Department of Corrections shall provide spe-
cial facilities and services that it deems fit and necessary for detained wit-
nesses.
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 17; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 902.15-.17 (West 1973). A
magistrate must require a material witness to a crime punishable by death or
life imprisonment to enter into a written recognizance to appear at trial or
forfeit a sum fixed by the magistrate, and shall commit the witness for failure
to comply. If a witness is unable to post security, the court may detain him for
up to three days to allow the state or defendant to conditionally examine him.
The state must pay witness fees for the period of commitment and cannot
unreasonably detain the witness.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-410 to -411 (1978). When a magistrate has commit-
ted the accused, the court may require witnesses to post bond. The sheriff sets
bond in such reasonable amount as may be just and fair.
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 804-15 to -19, 835-1 to -8 (1976). When a magistrate
has committed the defendant, he may require each material witness to enter
into a recognizance in a sum fixed at the magistrate's discretion and may com-
mit the witness for failure to do so. The court may levy a $100 fine on persons
not appearing to testify after entering into recognizance and may order the
sheriff to arrest and hold them until they give their testimony or post satisfac-
tory security. Alternatively, the court may issue a material witness order on
one or more specified grounds after a formal hearing in which it finds reason-
able cause to issue the order. The court may fix bail for a witness appearing
under such an order and may commit the witness who fails to post such bail.
The county must pay the witness $20 per day during confinement.
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-820 to -824 (1979). The magistrate may require
witnesses, including married women and infants, to enter an undertaking to




deems necessary. The magistrate may commit the witness if the security re-
quirement is not met; however, if on examination it appears that the witness is
unable to procure securities, he may be conditionally examined in the manner
of a preliminary hearing and released, unless he was an accomplice in the
crime charged.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-3(a), (d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); ch. 31,
§§ 17-18.1 (Smith-Hurd 1969). If an accused is held to answer, material wit-
nesses for either the state or defendant may be required to enter into a written
undertaking to appear at trial. Failure to enter into recognizance results in
commitment; failure to appear following recognizance results in forfeiture plus
criminal sanction. A coroner can also recognize a witness at an inquest and
commit to jail those who refuse to enter into recognizance.
IND. CODE §§ 35-1-9-3 to -4 (1976). During a "continuance" in a homicide
case, a justice may recognize witnesses in the same manner as prisoners are
held to bail. There is apparently no specific provision spelling out a judicial
power to commit a witness to insure appearance.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 804.11, .23, 811.2, 815.6 (West 1979). A law enforce-
ment officer may arrest any person upon probable cause belief that the person
is a necessary and material witness to a felony and might be unavailable for
service of a subpoena. The officer must immediately take the witness before a
magistrate, who may release him pursuant to the same conditions as those
placed on the release of a criminal defendant: placement in the custody of a
designated supervising person or organization; restrictions on travel, associa-
tion, or place of residence; return to custody in the evenings; or execution of an
appearance bond. If the witness is confined, the state must pay him witness
fees.
KAN. STAT. § 22-2805 (1974). The court or magistrate may require material
witnesses to post bond or to comply with other provisions to assure his appear-
ance. Failure to comply may, after hearing, result in commitment. The court
may order release after an "unreasonable length" of detention. The court may
not detain a witness because of inability to comply with the conditions of re-
lease if deposing the witness is possible and if "further detention is not neces-
sary to prevent a failure of justice."
KY. R. CRiM. P. 7.06. A court may require a material witness to give bail
for appearance, commit him to custody in lieu thereof, and order his release if
the court has detained him an unreasonable length of time.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:257-:259 (West 1967 & Supp. 1979). The judge
or committing magistrate may require a material witness to post bond and, if
the witness fails to comply, may arrest and detain him "in the parish jail or in
such suitable place as shall be designated by the court." A detained witness
may demand the taking of his deposition after forty-eight hours notice to the
accused, and shall then be discharged from custody. The deposition shall be
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admissible at trial unless the court can procure the presence of the witness by
subpoena.
ME. R. CRIM. P. 46(b). The court or magistrate may commit a material
witness upon failure to give bail, but may order the witness released if de-
tained an unreasonable length of time.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-203 (1974). In any criminal pro-
ceeding a magistrate must determine whether to detain a material witness or
require him to post reasonable bond. Unless the state's attorney obtains the
authority of the judge to detain the witness longer, the sheriff may not hold the
witness for more than seven days for failure to post the required bond. The
state must pay $10 per day in addition to witness fees.
MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, §§ 45-52, 54; ch. 277, § 70; ch. 262, § 30
(West 1968). If the state commits the defendant or admits him to bail, the
court or justice shall bind material witnesses for the state, including minors, by
recognizance or with sureties. The court may commit witnesses refusing to
recognize in felony cases. In felony cases against a defendant not in custody,
the court may hold a witness unable to furnish sureties for a reasonable time,
pending apprehension of the defendant. With the consent of the defendant, a
magistrate may take the deposition of a witness unable to furnish sureties. If
the district attorney believes that the public interest will not suffer by the re-
lease of a witness unable to furnish sureties, he shall tell the chief justice who
may order the witness discharged except if the witness is the prosecutor or an
accomplice. The Commissioner of Correction must make rules concerning
diet, size of cells, amount of liberty, correspondence, visits, and similar matters
so as to distinguish and separate witnesses from other prisoners as much as
possible consistent with their safety and testimony. Detained witnesses receive
a minimum of $1.50 per day in witness fees.
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.916-.917, .974-.975 (1978). A material witness un-
able to post bail must appear at a hearing before a court or circuit court com-
missioner, who can require the witness to recognize with sureties or be
commited to jail.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.10, 629.54-.55 (West 1947). When the magistrate
has committed the accused, he may bind by recognizance, with or without
sureties, all witnesses whom he deems material. He may commit witnesses for
failure to recognize only in cases involving murder in the first degree, arson
when human life has been destroyed, and cruel abuse of children. Persons
committed shall receive such compensation during confinement as the court
directs, not to exceed regular witness fees. The magistrate from whose order
the defendant has appealed shall require witnesses necessary to support the
complaint to recognize.




a witness to enter into a bond or recognizance and, in default thereof, commit
the witness to jail.
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 544.420-.440 (1978); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 23.08, .09. The
magistrate may bind a material witness in a felony case, including infants and
married women, by recognizance or bail bond and commit to prison a witness
who refuses to comply. Any witness committed to prison may be released if
deposed as provided by law.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 23; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 46-11-601, -15-201
(1979). A judge may require any material witness to enter into a written un-
dertaking and to provide additional sureties. A witness who fails to enter into
a written undertaking may be committed to custody. A witness who is com-
mitted may be held no longer than is necessary to take his deposition.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-305, -507 to -508 (1975). A magistrate who is satis-
fied that any witness in a felony case, including married women and minors,
will not appear and testify may require the witness to recognize with sufficient
securities and commit to jail those who refuse to comply.
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178-494, 189.040 (1973). A magistrate may require ma-
terial witnesses for the state to give bail. Upon failure to post bail, the magis-
trate may modify the bail requirement or commit the witness. The magistrate
may order the release of a witness detained for an unreasonable period of
time. The state may conditionally examine in the presence of the defendant a
material witness committed for his inability to meet security requirements, and
then must discharge the witness.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597:22-:23, 619:23 (1974 & West Supp. 1979). A
police officer may detain a necessary witness to a crime. The witness must be
brought before a superior court justice within twenty-four hours of arrest. The
justice must release the witness on recognizance or, upon failure to recognize,
commit the witness to jail. A confined witness is entitled to the net proceeds of
his labor.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 162-2 to -4 (West 1971). Material witnesses and per-
sons declaring crimes against other persons may be required to recognize with
sufficient surety if the crime is punishable by death or imprisonment in the
state prison, and may be committed upon default. Persons committed may not
be placed with those charged or convicted of a crime, but must be comfortably
lodged and not restricted further than necessary for detention. A detained
witness is entitled to fees of $3 per day.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-3-7 (1978); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CTS. 25. The
court may order a material witness to give bail. The court may commit any
witness who fails to comply with the order for a period not to exceed five days,
within which time his deposition must be taken. The court may extend this
time for no more than five additional days if necessary for the purpose of
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taking a deposition. Only in capital or more serious felony cases may the
court require surety.
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5; N.Y. CluM. PROC. LAW §§ 620.10-.80 (McKinney
1971). Detailed provisions apply to both state and defense witnesses in cases
of indictable offenses. Upon a sworn application, a court may order a poten-
tial witness to appear or, if such order would be ineffectual, order the person's
arrest. The person is entitled to a hearing and to the constitutional rights ac-
corded a defendant charged with a felony, including appointed counsel if indi-
gent. The court may fix bail if it determines that the person is a material
witness who will not respond to a subpoena. The court may commit a witness
if he fails to post bail. The court may vacate or modify its orders upon appli-
cation of either party. A witness must be paid $3 per day for each day of
confinement. A witness cannot be unreasonably detained.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-521, -803, 152-7 (1978). A material witness for the
state or the defendant may be detained or released subject to the same condi-
tions as a criminal defendant. The court after reasonable notice must afford a
witness a hearing, an opportunity to present evidence, and the right to counsel,
including appointed counsel if indigent. The witness may be required to at-
tend the hearing by subpoena or, if necessary, arrest. A judge may not incar-
cerate a material witness for a period longer than twenty days, but upon
review a judge may extend the period for terms not to exceed five days. Coro-
ners also may recognize material witnesses and jail those who default in giving
recognizances.
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 31-03-19 to -20, -24 (1974);
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(e). A court may order a material witness for the prosecu-
tion to give an undertaking with or without sureties. A witness confined for
his inability to furnish sureties may receive witness fees of fifty cents per day
for the period of imprisonment. A witness unable to obtain sureties cannot be
confined if his testimony "can adequately be secured by deposition, and fur-
ther detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice." A witness can-
not be unreasonably detained nor confined in any room where criminals are
imprisoned.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2937.16-.18, 2941.48 (Page 1975); OHIo R. CRIM.
P. 15(a). When an accused enters into a recognizance or is committed, the
court may require a witness for the state, including a minor, to enter into a
recognizance, with or without surety. The court may commit the witness for
failure to comply. A committed witness may be held in jail, but may not be
confined with prisoners charged or convicted of a crime; alternatively, he may
be kept in "open" detention or committed to the custody of a suitable person
or agency. A witness shall receive $25 for each day of custody. The court




pear. A committed witness may move to have his deposition taken and, once
taken, may be discharged.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 270-275, 719 (West 1969 & Supp. 1979). A
magistrate may require a material witness examined before him to enter into a
written undertaking, with or without sureties, and must commit a material
witness who refuses to comply. The court may require a witness who was
released on his own undertaking to give sureties, upon a sworn application
from the county attorney. The sheriff must bring a witness who is in custody
before a district court judge without unnecessary delay to inform him of his
constitutional rights, including his right to counsel. A witness must be con-
fined separately from criminals and is entitled to witness fees.
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.607-.615 (1977). A magistrate may require a witness
to enter an undertaking, with or without sureties, and may commit a witness
who fails to comply. A witness who is committed because of his inability to
furnish bond shall receive compensation of $7.50 per day.
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 46(b); R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRiM. P. 46(b). A court
may require a material witness to give bail for his appearance and to remain in
jail if unable to do so. A witness may obtain release if detained an unreasona-
ble length of time.
S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 15; S.C. CODE §§ 17-15-70, -110, -140, -150 (1976). A
judge may detain or release a material witness subject to the same conditions
as a criminal defendant: execution of an appearance bond; release on recogni-
zance; placement in the custody of a designated individual or organization;
restrictions on travel, association, or place of abode; return to custody after
specified hours; or any other conditions reasonably necessary to assure the
witness' appearance. Court clerks are authorized to grant bail to a witness and
to discharge a witness from custody. A witness may not be unreasonably de-
tained.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-12-1, -43-18 (1979). The same condi-
tions of release may be imposed on a material witness as imposed on a crimi-
nal defendant: placement in the custody of a designated person or
organization; restrictions on travel, association, or place of abode; execution of
an appearance or bail bond; return to custody after specified hours; or any
other condition reasonably necessary to assure the witness' appearance. A ma-
terial witness may not be detained if his testimony can be adequately secured
by deposition and "further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of
justice." On written motion by the confined witness, the court may direct that
the witness be deposed and thereafter discharged.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1210 (Supp. 1979), 40-1122 to -1127 (1975), 18-403
to -405 (1955), 8-2510 (1973). The magistrate must take from each material
witness examined by him a written undertaking to appear in the sum of $250;
a larger sum with sureties may be required if the magistrate has cause to be-
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lieve that the witness will not appear. The magistrate may require married
women and infants to procure sureties or they may be subpoened to appear
immediately and testify. On failure to enter into an undertaking or give bail,
the magistrate may order confinement. The court may order a witness' release
if he has been detained for an unreasonable length of time. Jailers are allowed
the same fees for keeping witnesses committed to jail as for keeping prisoners.
TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. tit. 17.34-.38 (Vernon 1977); 24.14-.15, 24.23-
.26 (1966). The court may require a witness for the state or defendant to give
bail, and may commit the witness for failure or refusal to do so. If the witness
is unable to give security upon such bail, the court must release him without
security, and may accept a personal bond. In addition, a court clerk may issue
an attachment for the appearance of a witness whom the defendant or state's
counsel has good reason to believe is about to move out of the county.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15-25 to -31, 78-24-11 (1978). The magistrate may
require a witness to promise to appear, with or without sureties, or forfeit
$200, and must commit a witness who fails to comply. Witnesses, except ac-
complices, who are unable to meet the security requirement shall be examined
and discharged. The magistrate may detain a witness only so long as the inter-
ests of justice require.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6605, 7551 (1974). A witness may be ordered to
enter into a recognizance with surety and may be committed to jail for refusal
to comply.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-127, -128, -135, -137, -152 (Michie 1975 & Supp.
1978). Although not clearly stated, a judge presumably may hold material
witnesses, because he may apply the same conditions of release as for a crimi-
nal defendant: placement in the custody of a designated person or organiza-
tion; restrictions on travel, association, or place of abode; execution of a bail
bond or other recognizance; return to custody after specified hours; or any
other condition reasonably necessary to assure the witness' appearance. Will-
ful failure to appear if released is a misdemeanor.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.52.040 (Supp. 1979); WASH. SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 6.12(e), 6.13(a). A witness for the state or the defendant may be
recognized with or without sureties. In default of recognizance, a hearing is
required to determine whether the testimony is material and whether the wit-
ness is not likely to attend the trial. The witness is entitled to appointed coun-
sel at the hearing. If detained, the witness receives daily fees plus regular
witness fees for court appearance. The witness' deposition also may be taken,
with possible release subject to the same conditions as for a criminal defend-
ant: execution of an appearance bond or recognizance; placement in the cus-
tody of a designated individual or organization; restrictions on travel or





W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-15 (1977). A witness on behalf of either the state or
the defendant may be required to post bail. No specific statutory section ap-
pears to contain commitment procedures.
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 969.01(3), 967.04(1), 979.11 (West 1971 & Supp. 1979).
A judge may require a material witness to give bail and may commit anyone
who fails to post bail for a period not to exceed fifteen days, within which time
his deposition shall be taken. In any case involving murder, manslaughter, or
homicide by reckless conduct or battery, a coroner may recognize a witness
and commit a witness who fails to recognize.
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 12; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-8-118 to -121, 1-12-109 to
-110 (1977); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 8(b), 8(f), 17(a). A court may require a mate-
rial witness for the state or the defendant to give bail and may commit a mate-
rial witness for failure to do so. Upon motion of the witness, the court may
order that the witness' deposition be taken, after which the court may dis-
charge him. The trial court exercises general supervision over the detention of
witnesses. Upon application to a judge of the supreme court or district court, a
witness may be discharged for illegal imprisonment. No witness can be de-
tained longer than necessary to take his testimony or deposition, nor be con-
fined in any room where criminals are imprisoned.
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APPENDIX B
MATERIAL WITNESSES: MODEL STATUTE
SEC. -. NEW SECTION: RELEASE OF MATERIAL WITNESSES
A. DEPOSITION
No material witness shall be detained because of inability to post a bail
bond if the testimony of such witness can be adequately secured by deposition,
and further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release
of the witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed
five days, until the deposition can be secured. Further extensions of the time
limit may be had only by order of court in compelling circumstances, for good
cause shown. At any such deposition all parties to the case shall be present,
and shall have the right to examine the witness. The witness' testimony shall
be preserved by stenographic record, tape recording, film, video tape, or a
combination thereof, as directed by the court.
B. DETENTION
If it appears by affidavit that a person's testimony is material in any criminal
proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure that
person's presence by subpoena, the person may be held as a witness and de-
posed as provided in Section A. Deposition shall be dispensed with and a
witness shall be incarcerated beyond the period stipulated in Section A only in
extraordinary cases in which continued confinement is essential to prevent a
failure of justice.
C. HEARING AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Before confinement under either Section A or Section B, the witness shall be
entitled to a hearing. The burden of proof shall be on the movant, whether the
state or the defendant, seeking to restrict the witness' liberty. The court shall
inform the witness of his right to counsel, and shall have authority to appoint
counsel for the witness if the witness requests appointment of counsel.
D. SEPARATE CONFINEMENT
Any material witness who is detained shall be confined separately from per-
sons accused or convicted of criminal offenses.
E. FEES TO MATERIAL WITNESSES
Persons confined as material witnesses shall, for each day of confinement,
receive such fees as are set by the court. Except as the interests of justice
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require, the witness shall be awarded, for each day of confinement, the same
fee set by statute for ordinary witnesses who give testimony.
F. EXPEDITED APPEAL
Any detained witness may make application to reduce bail or to amend the
court order authorizing the witness' confinement. An application shall be filed
with the court having jurisdiction of appeals from any court that fixes bail for,
or orders detention of, a witness. An application shall be set for prompt hear-
ing on appeal, and in no event shall the appeal be heard later than five days
from the time of the filing of the application.
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